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Commerce Clause

The New “Click-Through”?: New York Budget Proposal Requires Marketplace Providers to Collect Tax

by McDermott Will & Emery and Stephen P. Kranz | Jan 22, 2015 | Constitutional Issues, Nationwide Importance, New York, Nexus, Sales Tax, Transaction Taxes

On January 21, Governor Cuomo delivered his State of the State address, along with proposing the new budget. The budget has a number of new tax proposals. One of those proposals would have a significant impact on e-commerce companies. Part X of the budget proposal amends the sales tax statutes to require marketplace providers to collect and remit sales tax on sales to New York customers. A marketplace provider is a person who, pursuant to an agreement with a seller, “facilitates a sale, occupancy, or admission” by the seller. A person can be a marketplace provider if they facilitate the sale, or are an affiliate of a person facilitating the sale. For purposes of this definition, affiliate companies are companies that have common ownership of 5 percent.

“Facilitates a sale, occupancy, or admission” means:

(1) such person, or an affiliated person, collects the receipts, rent or amusement charge paid by a customer, occupant or patron to a marketplace seller; and

(2) such person performs either of the following activities:

(A) provides the forum in which, or by means of which, the sale takes place or the offer of occupancy or admission is accepted, including a shop, store or booth, or an internet website, catalog or a similar forum; or

(B) arranges for the exchange of information or messages between the customer, occupant or patron, as the case may be, and the marketplace seller.

A marketplace provider meeting these requirements would be required to collect as if the marketplace provider were the vendor.

Under current law, a seller is required to collect and remit tax on sales made to New York customers. Under the budget proposal, a seller would no longer be required to collect if the marketplace provider provides a collection certificate to the seller. (The Division of Taxation is required to develop procedures to administer the certificate). If a marketplace provider does not provide a collection certificate, but does use language approved by the Division of Taxation and Finance in a publicly-available agreement, that will have the same effect as the provision of a collection certificate.

The imposition under the proposal is directly on the marketplace provider. There does not appear to currently be any provision that would allow a seller in a marketplace to collect instead of the marketplace provider, if the seller so desired.

Marketplace providers are relieved of liability if the information provided to them by the seller is incorrect. However, there is no provision in the bill requiring the marketplace sellers to provide any information to the marketplace provider.

The law does not change existing nexus or ‘doing business’ requirements. It appears that a marketplace provider would be required to collect only if the marketplace provider has nexus with New York under the Commerce Clause.

This proposal would have a significant effect on e-commerce companies, and could have an impact reminiscent of the impact of the click-through statutes. Companies that sell through a [...]

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If At First You Don’t Succeed, Try, Try Again: Illinois General Assembly Sends Revised Version of Click-Through Nexus Law to the Governor for Signature

by Arthur R. Rosen and Mary Kay McCalla Martire | Jul 30, 2014 | Constitutional Issues, Illinois, Nationwide Importance, Nexus, Sales Tax, Transaction Taxes

In 2011, Illinois became one of the first states to follow New York’s lead by enacting “click-through nexus” legislation. The Illinois law created nexus for any out-of-state retailer that contracted with a person in Illinois who displayed a link on his, her or its website that had the ability to connect an Internet user to the remote retailer’s website, when those referrals generated over $10,000 per year in sales. Pub. Act 96-1544, §§5, 10 (eff. Mar. 10, 2011) (codified at 35 ILCS 105/2(1.1) and 35 ILCS 110/2(1.1) (West 2010). On October 13, 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the click-through nexus law violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) by imposing a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce. Performance Marketing Ass’n v. Hamer, 2013 IL 114496. The court held that the statute unlawfully discriminated against Internet retailers by imposing a use tax collection obligation based only on Internet referrals but not on print or over-the-air broadcasting referrals. The court did not reach the question whether the law also violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (although the trial court had also rejected the law on this basis).

In its recently completed Spring 2014 legislative session, the Illinois General Assembly approved an amendment to the click-through law that was designed to correct the deficiencies found by the Illinois Supreme Court. SB0352 (the Bill). The Bill expands the definition of a “retailer maintaining a place of business in this State” under the Illinois Use Tax and Service Occupation Tax Acts (Acts) to include retailers who contract with Illinois persons who refer potential customers to the retailer by providing a promotional code or other mechanism that allows the retailer to track purchases referred by the person (referring activities). The referring activities can include an Internet link, a promotional code distributed through hand-delivered or mailed material or promotional codes distributed by persons through broadcast media. The Bill goes on to provide that retailers can rebut the presumption of nexus created by the use of promotional codes or other tracking mechanisms by submitting proof that the referring activities are not sufficient to meet the nexus standards of the United States Constitution. Presumably, under the principles of Scripto and Tyler, if a remote seller can demonstrate that the Illinois referrals are not “significantly associated” with its ability to “establish or maintain” the Illinois market, the presumption will be rebutted.

As amended, the Bill appears to address the ITFA concerns expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court by not singling out internet-type referrals. It also attempts to resolve any due process constitutional concerns by providing an opportunity for retailers to rebut the presumption of nexus created by their use of referring activities. The Bill was sent to the Illinois governor for signature on June 27. The Bill will take immediate effect upon becoming law.

At present, four other states (Georgia, Kansas, Maine and Missouri) have click-through nexus laws that expressly extend the presumption of nexus to non-Internet based referring activities. [...]

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Was It Wirth It? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Sets a Low Bar for Minimum Contacts

by Diann Smith and Stephen P. Kranz | Jul 28, 2014 | Constitutional Issues, Income Tax, Nexus, Pennsylvania

In Wirth v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Pennsylvania personal income tax applied to non-resident limited partners whose only connection with the state was the ownership of a small interest in a partnership that owned Pennsylvania property. This ruling has weakened the effectiveness of the Due Process Clause as a defense against Pennsylvania taxation.

In 1984 and 1985, the non-resident appellants purchased interests in a Connecticut limited partnership organized solely for the purchase and management of a skyscraper located in Pittsburgh. The appellants each owned between one-quarter of a unit to one unit of the partnership. One unit equated to a 0.151281 percent interest. The opinion does not indicate whether any of the numerous non-appellant partners owned significantly larger shares. Further, all of the appellants were only passive investors and did not take “an active role in managing the [p]roperty.” After 20 years of losses, the lender foreclosed on the property. The appellants lost their entire investments, but the partnership reported a gain on its tax filings consisting of the unpaid balance of the nonrecourse note’s principal and the accrued interest, totaling $2,628,491,551. As a result, the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue assessed personal income tax against the appellants, plus interest and penalties.

The appellants argued that the Commerce and Due Process Clauses prohibited the imposition of the Pennsylvania personal income tax on them. The court did not determine whether the Commerce Clause bars the imposition of the personal income tax on these non-residents because the appellants waived this defense by not sufficiently distinguishing between the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause arguments.

The court did reach a decision on whether the Due Process Clause would bar relief and held that the limited interest in the partnership amounted to minimum contacts with Pennsylvania. The court agreed with the Department, which argued that the appellants’ interests, while limited, were “hardly passive” because of the large amount of money invested by each appellant, the extensive lifespan of the partnership and the partnership’s ownership of the Pennsylvania skyscraper. (Interestingly, this statement from the court’s opinion echoes the Department’s brief; however, the Department instead describes the appellants’ actions as passive “on a technical level” and describes the appellants’ involvement with the partnership as “hardly trivial.” The Department’s statement works to clear up confusion as to how an interest that is, by definition, passive could not be passive, but does raise the question as to why the court would opt to affirmatively state that the appellants’ involvement was “hardly passive.”) The court was also particularly concerned by the fact that had the appellants not had minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, any income earned by the appellants would escape Pennsylvania tax.

Practice Note: This case does not mean that other non-resident limited partners should accept Pennsylvania taxation. Because the appellants did not adequately argue the Commerce Clause issues, this line of argument remains viable. Further, the court’s concern with the possibility that income related to Pennsylvania property could escape Pennsylvania tax should be a question [...]

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Allied Domecq: Nexus-Combined Reporting

by Diann Smith and Stephen P. Kranz | Jul 16, 2014 | Constitutional Issues, Income Tax, Massachusetts, Nexus

In Allied Domecq Spirits & Wines USA, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that the parent company of a Massachusetts taxpayer could not be included in the taxpayer’s Massachusetts nexus-combined returns because the parent’s nexus with Massachusetts was a sham. Regardless of the validity of the parent’s presence in the state, an argument exists that the nexus limitation on filing combined returns as it existed during the tax years discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.

The parent company, ADNAC, was incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Canada. ADNAC carried substantial losses. Beginning in August 1996, ADNAC engaged in activities to create a Massachusetts presence, such as reimbursing an affiliate with Massachusetts nexus for the salaries of insurance and tax employees and renting Massachusetts office space from the affiliate to house the employees. Further, ADNAC’s Massachusetts’ affiliate transferred three internal audit department employees working in Massachusetts to ADNAC. For the years in question, 1996 – 2004, Massachusetts required corporations to have in-state nexus in order to file combined reports and share losses with affiliated entities. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, § 32B. As a result of these transactions, the taxpayer believed ADNAC had established nexus with Massachusetts and included ADNAC in its Massachusetts combined returns.

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that, because of the sham transaction doctrine, ADNAC did not have nexus with Massachusetts for tax purposes and could not file on a combined basis in the state. The court ruled, in part, that the transactions involving insurance and tax employees were shams because two memos developed by the taxpayer’s tax department described the plan as a “state tax planning project,” indicated the favorable tax consequences of the transaction, and stated that the plan would have “no impact to the management results.” The court viewed these communications as the taxpayer admitting that the transactions involving tax and insurance employees were conceived of entirely for tax planning purposes and for no business purpose. While the court could not point to any documents stating a tax purpose behind the movement of the internal audit department employees to Massachusetts, the court decided that because no contemporaneous records indicated a business motivation, the court would grant the use of the sham transaction doctrine.

Practice Note: The taxpayer did not argue that Massachusetts’ requirement of in-state nexus to file on a combined basis discriminated against interstate commerce and violated the Commerce Clause. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Allied Domecq is similar to USX Corporation v. Revenue Cabinet, Kentucky, in which a Kentucky Circuit Court declared that a provision of Kentucky’s capital stock tax that limited to domestic corporations the ability to file on a combined basis or exclude investments in subsidiaries from its tax base discriminated against interstate commerce. USX Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet, No. 91-CI-01864 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1992); see also Hellerstein & Hellerstein, State Taxation 4.14[3][j] (Thomson Reuters/Tax & Accounting, 3rd ed. 2001 & Supp. 2014-1). The court held [...]

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You Do the Math: Unclaimed Property Lawsuit Filed Against Kelmar

by Diann Smith, Eric D. Carstens and Stephen P. Kranz | Jun 9, 2014 | Constitutional Issues, Delaware, Nationwide Importance, Unclaimed Property

Mark McQuillen, president of Kelmar Associates, LLC, was misinformed when he was quoted as saying “I’ve never been sued” on May 26—less than one week after suit was filed against Kelmar and three Delaware state officials in a Delaware Federal District Court. See 72 State Tax Notes 455 (May 26, 2014). While the timing of this statement was an unfortunate – but likely honest – mistake, the lawsuit filed by Temple-Inland Inc. asserts the conduct of Kelmar in conducting an unclaimed property audit on behalf of the state of Delaware was anything but.

According to the complaint, Temple-Inland was initially asked to pay over $2 million to the state based on the “fatally flawed” extrapolation methodology used by Kelmar to calculate Temple-Inland’s liability (and Kelmar’s paycheck from Delaware). While the demand was reduced to $1.38 million after the plaintiff initiated administrative review, the result and details of how they got there remains alarming. Of note, Kelmar estimated that nearly $1 million was due to Delaware for the seven-year period of 1986 through 2003 after identifying a single unreported check for $147.30 during a subsequent six-year period (Complaint ¶ 84). The complaint contains countless examples of voided and reissued checks (even checks that escheated to other states) that were used in Kelmar’s extrapolation formula. Ultimately the result for Temple-Inland was a demand from Delaware alone of over $100,000 escheatable for prior year’s accounts payable, despite having only around $15,000 escheatable to all other states on these accounts for a five year period actually reviewed.

Based on these practices, Temple-Inland asserts that Kelmar and the state auditing officials have unconstitutionally applied the amendment to Delaware Escheat Law allowing for estimations of unclaimed property liability to years prior to its enactment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Along those same lines, the state penalized Temple-Inland for failing to maintain records for periods prior to 2010, when a substantive document retention requirement was imposed in the state (see S.B. 272 § 4). Nonetheless, Temple-Inland asserts that the methodology used by Kelmar violates federal common law, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Commerce Clause and Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The opening brief filed on behalf of Temple-Inland is available here

Practice Note: While Delaware has settled every suit raising these questions and has an economic incentive to keep them from reaching what would likely be an adverse decision to the state’s (and Kelmar’s) financial interest, the discussion should not end there. Temple-Inland Inc. had a long history of solid compliance with the unclaimed property laws across several states, yet still was the target of a flawed and likely unconstitutional audit by Kelmar on behalf of the state of Delaware. The company was forced to hire counsel and litigate against Kelmar’s questionable practices. While two new Delaware bills have been introduced in an effort to eliminate unclaimed property contingent fee auditing practices (S.B. 215 and S.B. 228), holders should stand firm in opposition to Kelmar’s aggressive extrapolation methods and keep [...]

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U.S. Supreme Court Turns its Attention to State Tax, Agrees to Hear “Double Taxation” Case

by McDermott Will & Emery | Jun 2, 2014 | Constitutional Issues, Income Tax, Maryland

The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari filed by the Maryland Comptroller of Treasury in Comptroller v. Wynne, Dkt. No. 13-485 (U.S. Sup. Ct., cert. granted May 27, 2014). The central issue in Wynne is whether a state must allow its residents a credit for income taxes paid to other states, in a manner sufficient to prevent double taxation of income from interstate commerce, to avoid violating the fair apportionment and discrimination prongs of the dormant Commerce Clause.

Like most states, Maryland taxes its residents on their entire income, wherever earned, and permits a credit for income tax paid to other states, limited to the amount of Maryland tax on the income taxed by other states. But Maryland’s income tax includes both a state and a county tax component, and Maryland permitted a credit for taxes paid to other states only with respect to its state income tax. The state rate was 4.75 percent and the county tax rate applicable to the Wynnes was 3.2 percent (which could vary by county). The county tax was imposed and administered by the state on the same tax base as the state income tax, and residents file a single return that reflects both state and county income taxes. Thus, Maryland provided a credit only against the Maryland state income tax, but not the substantial county income tax, on the income taxed by other states, resulting in a form of double taxation of that income (i.e., by the other state and by the Maryland county).

The Wynnes reported substantial income on their 2006 individual return from business activities in interstate commerce. They owned 2.4 percent of an S corporation doing business in 39 states, and paid income tax to most of those states on the income that flowed through to their individual return. The Wynnes reported $2.7 million of income and $126,636 of Maryland state income tax (not including the county income tax portion) prior to credits, and claimed a credit of $84,550 for taxes paid to other states. The Maryland Comptroller permitted the Wynnes to claim a credit against the state income tax, but not the county portion of the income tax, for taxes paid to other states. Maryland’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, agreed with the Wynnes that they suffered double taxation of the income in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that taxation of multistate business requires fair apportionment and no discrimination against interstate commerce, citing Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) and other Supreme Court cases.

In its petition for certiorari, the Maryland Comptroller relied upon settled Due Process doctrine that states have plenary power to tax all of the income of their residents. The Comptroller’s petition essentially ignored the Commerce Clause issues raised by the Maryland Court of Appeals.

The U.S. solicitor general filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the Maryland Comptroller’s position, recognizing the different standards imposed by the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause but nonetheless contending that the longstanding [...]

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Oklahoma Supreme Court KOs the Constitution

by McDermott Will & Emery, Diann Smith and Stephen P. Kranz | May 5, 2014 | Constitutional Issues, Incentives, Income Tax, Nationwide Importance, Oklahoma, Tax Base

On April 22, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma released its opinion in CDR Systems Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission. Case No. 109,886; 2014 OK 31. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, overturning the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, held that an Oklahoma statute, which grants a deduction for income from gains that result from the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of an “Oklahoma company,” is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. “Oklahoma company” is defined as an entity that has had its primary headquarters in Oklahoma for at least three uninterrupted years prior to the date of the taxable transaction.

In a 5-4 decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that there was no discrimination against out-of-state commerce. Even if there was discrimination, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the statute does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, does not have a discriminatory purpose and has no discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reasoning was based in part on the conclusion that the statute treated all taxpayers the same.

In his dissent, Justice Combs reached the opposite conclusion and wrote that the deduction is unconstitutional because the primary headquarters requirement is based upon the level of business a company conducts in Oklahoma, and therefore it discriminates against out-of-state taxpayers. The dissent concluded that the statute effectively creates a tax on taxpayers with an out-of-state headquarters.

Although the majority ably walked through the existing case precedent on these issues, it misunderstood the practical effect of the statute. First, the majority concluded that the statute did not discriminate against any particular market because all markets are treated the same. This conclusion ignores the fact that under the statute, in-state markets are treated differently than out-of-state markets. The majority stated that “[w]ithout any actual or prospective competition in a single market, there is no negative impact on interstate commerce that results from the application of this deduction and no discrimination against interstate commerce . . . .” (Majority Opinion, p. 14). However, there is competition between in-state companies and out-of-state companies, not just in a single market but in all markets.

In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997), which upheld the constitutionality of a tax that discriminated across markets (in other words, the statute benefited an in-state entity not because the entity was in-state but because it was in a different market and sold different products than an out-of-state entity). The dissent specifically took exception to the majority’s reliance on Gen. Motors, for good reason. The Tracy case does not appear to be applicable here, because the in-state and out-of-state entities are competing in the same markets under the Oklahoma statute.

Second, the majority concluded that the statute did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce because “[t]he degree to which the entity generating the gains participated in out-of-state activity, i.e. interstate commerce, is not relevant to whether the entity qualifies for the deduction” (Majority Opinion, p. 17). The [...]

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