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Sales Tax

Alabama Appellate Court Finds Photos Merely Incidental to Nontaxable Photography Services

by McDermott Will & Emery, Eric D. Carstens and Stephen P. Kranz | May 6, 2016 | Alabama, Audits, Nationwide Importance, Sales Tax, Tax Base, Transaction Taxes

Last Friday, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals handed the Department of Revenue (Department) a significant loss in their continued attempt to tax non-enumerated services and tangible property provided in conjunction with those services under the sales tax. See State Dep’t of Revenue v. Omni Studio, LLC, No. 2140889 (Ala. Civ. App. Apr. 29, 2016). Specifically, the appellate court affirmed the taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment granted by the trial court, which set aside the Department’s assessment on the basis that photographs provided by a photography studio are merely incidental to the nontaxable photography services provided by the studio. While the prospective effect of the holding in the photography context is unclear due to recent amendments to the photography regulation (effective January 4, 2016), the case is significant in that it strengthens the “incidental to service” (or “true object”) precedent in Alabama and should be seen as a rebuke to the Department for ignoring judicial precedent in favor of their own administrative practices and guidance.

This decision is important in analyzing the taxability of mixed/bundled sales to Alabamans (i.e., where services and some degree of tangible personal property are provided as part of the same transaction). As with any decision, taxpayers should consider potential refund claims. (more…)

No Surprises in Ohio CAT Nexus Oral Argument

by Diann Smith and Stephen P. Kranz | May 4, 2016 | Audits, Constitutional Issues, Nationwide Importance, Nexus, Ohio, Sales Tax, Transaction Taxes

Oral argument before the Ohio Supreme Court took place on May 3 in the three cases challenging Ohio’s Commercial Activity Tax (CAT) nexus standard. Crutchfield, Inc. v. Testa, Case No. 2015-0386; Mason Cos. Inc. v. Testa, Case No. 2015-0794; Newegg, Inc. v. Testa, Case No. 2015-0483. Ohio imposes its CAT on a business that has more than $500,000 in annual gross receipts in the state, even if the business has no physical presence in the state. These three taxpayers have challenged this standard as violating the Commerce Clause substantial nexus test.

The oral argument in the cases proceeded as expected. The majority of the time for both parties was taken up by questions from the bench. Several judges quizzed the taxpayers’ counsel about the assertion that no business was conducted in Ohio. The judges focused on activities such as products being received by customers in Ohio and software being placed on customers’ computers in Ohio to facilitate ordering or to track customer activity in Ohio. The taxpayers’ counsel vigorously disagreed with this construction of the facts – noting that whatever happened in Ohio, all of the taxpayers’ actions occurred elsewhere. He stated that the activities called out by the judges were no different than receiving and reviewing a catalog in the state.

The taxpayers’ counsel repeatedly cited to Tyler Pipe as the controlling law in this case – noting that before a state could impose a tax on a business, that business had to do something in the taxing state (or have something done on its behalf) that helped it establish and maintain a market in the state. According to the taxpayers’ counsel, it was not enough that a market exists in the taxing state; the taxpayer had to be doing something in the taxing state. He asserted that the taxpayer conducted no business activities in the state and thus Tyler Pipe prevented the state from imposing the CAT on them. This became the taxpayers’ mantra throughout the argument. (more…)

BREAKING NEWS: Sales Tax Battle Breaks Out in South Dakota; Quill’s Last Stand?

by McDermott Will & Emery and Stephen P. Kranz | Apr 29, 2016 | Audits, Constitutional Issues, Nexus, Sales Tax, South Dakota, Transaction Taxes

This post is a follow-up to a previous post from April 21, 2016.

Introduction

On March 22, 2016, South Dakota Governor Dennis Daugaard signed into law Senate Bill 106, which requires any person making more than $100,000 of South Dakota sales or more than 200 separate South Dakota sales transactions to collect and remit sales tax. The requirement applies to sales made on or after May 1, 2016.

The law clearly challenges the physical presence requirement under Quill, and that’s precisely what the legislature intended. The law seeks to force a challenge to the physical presence rule as soon as possible and speed that challenge through the courts.

As we discussed in our earlier post, the big question in response to the legislation was whether taxpayers should register to collect tax. For those who did not register, an injunction is now in place barring enforcement of the provisions until the litigation is resolved.

Last night and this morning two different declaratory judgment suits were filed in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court of South Dakota regarding S.B. 106’s constitutionality, and more may follow. As has already been reported in a few outlets, one of these cases is American Catalog Mailers Association and NetChoice v. Gerlach (the ACMA Suit). In ACMA, the plaintiffs are trade associations representing catalog marketers and e-commerce retailers. The complaint can be found here.

What has yet to be widely reported is the other suit. This suit (the State Suit) was filed by South Dakota. Letters sent by South Dakota indicated that identified retailers needed to register by April 25. Because the new law does not become effective until May 1, many observers thought that South Dakota might wait to file until after that date. However, the suits have already been filed.

(more…)

Should I Register in South Dakota?

by McDermott Will & Emery and Stephen P. Kranz | Apr 21, 2016 | Constitutional Issues, Nationwide Importance, Nexus, Sales Tax, South Dakota, Transaction Taxes

Introduction

The law clearly violates the physical-presence requirement under Quill, and that’s precisely what the legislature intended. The law is intended to force a challenge to the physical presence rule as soon as possible.

The South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department) has begun taking steps to enforce the law. We are aware that remote sellers recently received letters from the Department giving the sellers a deadline of April 25, 2016 to either register with the state and commit to collection, or notify the Department that the seller does not meet the law’s gross receipts/sales transactions thresholds. If the seller does neither of these things, South Dakota will assume that the seller does not intend to comply and that South Dakota may initiate legal action against the seller under the new law.

Remote sellers who have received these letters, as well as any other remote sellers who have exposure under the new law, are probably looking for answers to one question: Should we register and begin collecting? There are two important issues to discuss in determining whether to comply: (1) retroactivity and (2) refunds. (more…)

Viral Marketers Beware – In Alabama, Sales Tax Nexus Created for Out-of-State Bookseller Even Though In-State Teachers Not Acting on Behalf of Seller

by Diann Smith and Stephen P. Kranz | Mar 31, 2016 | Alabama, Audits, Constitutional Issues, Nationwide Importance, Nexus, Sales Tax, Transaction Taxes

After a quarter of a century, the school book nexus cases continue to proliferate, delight and mystify. The latest installment in the saga is from Alabama. Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. 2931 v. State Of Alabama Department Of Revenue, Ala. Tax Tribunal, Dkt. No. S. 14-374 (March 25, 2016). Like the other cases, the question addressed is whether a vendor with no property or employees in the state nevertheless has nexus for sales tax collection purposes because of the activities of unrelated, and uncompensated, teachers in the state. Like all of the other cases, these teachers received unsolicited catalogs from the vendor and could either discard the materials or distribute them to their students. Like all of the other cases, if a teacher elected to distribute the materials, the teacher collected completed order forms and payments from the students and mailed the order and payments to the vendor. Like all of the other cases, the teacher distributed the order once received to the individual students that placed orders. Also, like all of the other cases the vendor provided bonus points to teachers based on the dollar amount ordered. The vendor intended the bonus points be used to purchase additional classroom materials – either from the vendor directly or through gift cards to another retailer.

In reaching its decision, the Alabama Tax Tribunal (the Court) restricted its analysis to the historical Quill physical presence standard. While noting that on the same facts courts in other states have been severely split on the issue of whether physical presence existed for such a vendor, the Court determined that the opinions finding physical presence were more persuasive. The Court quoted at length from Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 38 A.3d 1183 (Conn. 2012).

As with most of the other bookseller cases in which a court found substantial nexus existed, the Alabama Tax Tribunal focused on the Scripto language negating the importance of labels such as “agent,” “independent contractor,” and “representative.” This is a red-herring, as the correct analysis should be that regardless of the label, on whose behalf were the teachers acting. Evidence was introduced that the teachers were acting on behalf of their students, not the vendor. The Court, however, assumed this bedrock issue away by finding that regardless of on whose behalf the teachers were acting, because the teachers’ activities were substantially associated with Scholastic’s ability to establish and maintain a market in the state, this result was sufficient to establish physical presence for the vendor. According to the Court, it did not matter that the teachers did not receive any type of compensation from the vendor and did not intend to benefit the vendor. The only thing that mattered to the nexus analysis was that at the end of the day, the teachers were important to Scholastic’s maintenance of a market in the state.

But that cannot be the correct analysis. Otherwise, any advertising campaign that relied on word-of-mouth (and similarly any viral marketing campaign) would establish nexus [...]

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Alabama Legislature Rejects (Yet Another) Attempted Digital Tax Expansion

by McDermott Will & Emery, Eric D. Carstens and Stephen P. Kranz | Mar 21, 2016 | Alabama, Audits, Nationwide Importance, Sales Tax, Tax Base, Transaction Taxes

Last month, a much-anticipated bill drafted by the Alabama Department of Revenue (Department) was introduced in the Alabama Senate that would have expanded the definition of tangible personal property to include “digital goods.” See Senate Bill 242 (introduced February 16, 2016). Fortunately, the Senate Finance and Taxation Education Committee (Committee) rejected the bill on March 9, 2016, after hearing testimony from Assistant Department Counsel Christy Edwards and extensively questioning her on the bill’s content and motives. Notably, the Department continues to take aggressive positions in an effort to tax digital goods and services, without the requisite statutory or legislative approval to back it up.

Background

On February 28 2015, the Department proposed an amendment to Regulation 810-6-5-.09, which would have amended the rental tax on tangible personal property to include “digital transmissions” (broadly defined to include digital content such as streamed audio and video). After significant opposition from industry representatives, the Joint Legislative Council (composed of leadership from both chambers) wrote a letter to Commissioner Julie Magee in April 2015 requesting that the proposed regulation be withdrawn. It cited to the fact that the proposal was overly expansive and would in effect be the imposition of a new tax, a determination that rests with the legislature. See our prior coverage here. With hesitation and only after continued pushback from the Legislative Council, the Department withdrew the rental tax regulation amendment on July 7, 2015.

In response to the rejection of the proposed regulation, the Department went through its historic revenue rulings and revoked a number of technology rulings in January 2016, noting they will continue attempting to apply the rental tax to streaming services. Commissioner Magee cited the revocations as a mere “clarification” that did not change the law. In her comments to the revocations, Commissioner Magee noted that all taxpayers will be collecting and remitting tax in the future “[e]ither legislatively through a digital goods bill or through audits and assessments.”

Senate Bill 242

The digital goods bill arrived just a few weeks later, sponsored by Senator Trip Pittman. As introduced, the bill would define “tangible personal property” to include “digital goods.” For these purposes, digital goods include “[s]ounds, images, data, facts, or information, or any combination thereof, transferred electronically, including, but not limited to, specified digital products and any other service transferred electronically that uses one or more software applications.” As is readily apparent, this language is extremely broad and arguably includes every service delivered over the internet. The definition also raised concerns because it borrows from Streamlined language (“transferred electronically”; “specified digital products”), but Alabama is not a Streamlined state and does not define those terms elsewhere in the legislation or Code. As drafted, the bill would have become effective immediately upon passage.

After cancelling a scheduled Committee hearing earlier this month, citing the need for revisions, the sponsor and Department entered the March 9 public hearing with a substitute bill. Instead of defining “digital [...]

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Illinois Department of Revenue Further Revises its Proposed Amendments to Shipping and Handling Regulations

by Mary Kay McCalla Martire | Feb 19, 2016 | False Claims Act, Illinois, Local Tax, Sales Tax

The Illinois Department of Revenue (Department) has further revised its recently proposed amendments to the regulations governing the taxability of shipping and handling charges. See our prior coverage here. The revisions to the Proposed Amendments to 86 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 130.415 and 130.410 (Revised Proposed Amendments) were made in response to particular comments and concerns raised by industry groups, as explained by the Department in its Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The Revised Proposed Amendments address the following topics:

Retroactivity of the Revised Proposed Amendments to November 19, 2009, the date of the Kean decision: The Department added a “safe harbor provision” for taxpayers that have complied with the existing regulation for time periods prior to the effective date of the Revised Proposed Amendments. Prop. 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 130.415(b)(1)(A)(i). Taxpayers fitting within the safe harbor will be considered to be in compliance with Illinois law regarding the taxability of delivery charges.
Clarification of taxpayers subject to the Revised Proposed Amendments: The Department clarified that all persons making taxable sales or collecting or self-assessing Illinois use tax are subject to the Revised Proposed Amendments. Prop. § 130.415(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Free shipping option: The Department has added language expressly stating that when a seller offers customers free standard shipping or “qualified” free shipping (i.e., free shipping for purchases totaling at least a certain amount), any other separately stated shipping service for which a seller charges customers (i.e., expedited shipping) are separately contracted for and thus nontaxable. Rev. Prop. § 130.415(b)(1)(B)(ii), (C). For delivery charges to qualify as nontaxable because a seller offers “qualified” free shipping, the customer’s purchase must actually be eligible for free shipping (i.e., must total at least a specified dollar threshold). Rev. Prop. § 130.415(b)(1)(D)(v).
Taxability of delivery charges where taxability or tax rate of underlying property differs: The Revised Proposed Amendments also provide that sellers can elect to itemize delivery charges on sales of taxable and tax exempt items and low and high rate items and pay the associated tax on shipping charges as determined by the underlying item. Rev. Prop. 130.415(b)(1)(F)(i). In the absence of separately identifying the delivery charges, the “lump sum” rules as set forth in the original version of the Proposed Amendments will apply. Rev. Prop. § 130.415(b)(1)(F)(i).
Taxability of delivery charges where taxability of charges themselves differ: The Department also added a similar rule based on taxability of the delivery charges themselves, in a circumstance, for example, where some charges are taxable and others are not. The Revised Proposed Amendments mirror the rule expressed above, stating that that a seller can separately state delivery charges for each item sold and pay the associated tax as determined per item. Rev. Prop. 130.415(b)(1)(E)(i). If the invoice contains a lump sum of total delivery charges, the sum will not be taxable if the selling price of items with nontaxable delivery charges is greater than the selling price of items with taxable delivery charges. [...]

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Illinois Appellate Court Upholds Finding of Consumer Fraud Act Violation in Sales Tax Overcollection Case

by Catherine A. Battin | Feb 9, 2016 | Illinois, Sales Tax

The Illinois Appellate Court recently affirmed a finding for a plaintiff individual, upholding the circuit court’s conclusion that defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co. (Sears) violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1) (the Act) by overcharging plaintiff sales tax on his purchase of a digital television converter box (converter box”). Aliano v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 143367 (Dec. 30, 2015). Sears appealed the circuit court’s ruling on two bases: (1) that the court failed to find that the plaintiff was actually deceived by any alleged misrepresentation made by Sears (an element required to be found for a violation of the Act); and (2) that the court found Sears had violated that Act based on its determination that overcollection of sales tax “is a de jure deceptive practice violation of the [Act].” Although it upheld the underlying ruling, the court reversed the circuit court’s award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Consumer Fraud Act and remanded for a determination of the amount of reasonable fees to which the plaintiff is entitled.

Plaintiff’s claim under the Act was based on his purchase of a converter box. At the time of his purchase, Plaintiff presented a coupon issued by the federal government for a $40 credit against the purchase price. The coupon entitled Sears to a reimbursement by the federal government for the lesser of $40 or the purchase price of the converter box. Approximately a year before Plaintiff’s purchase, the Illinois Department of Revenue (the Department) had issued a bulletin stating that the portion of the selling price covered by the coupon was not subject to Illinois sales tax. Despite this guidance, the Sears sales associates who handled Plaintiff’s purchase charged him sales tax on the full selling price of the converter box. Plaintiff sued, alleging that Sears wrongfully collected sale tax on the value of the coupon.

In arguing that Plaintiff was not deceived by the sales associate’s representation of the amount of tax owed, Sears contended that Plaintiff knew he would be overcharged sales tax on the purchase, and that he “went shopping for a lawsuit.” One month before Plaintiff’s purchase, the case captioned Nava v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. was filed in the circuit court, in which virtually identical allegations were made against Sears. (On allegations that Sears violated the Act, the appellate court eventually determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed and reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sears (see Nava v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 122063 (July 29, 2013).) Despite finding that “[t]he facts relied upon by Sears could certainly support the inference that the plaintiff was not deceived by the representations of Sears’s sales associate as to the net amount that he owed and that he was well aware at the time that he purchased the converter box that sales tax should not have been assessed on the $40 value of the NTIA coupon which he [...]

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Massachusetts Department of Revenue Introduces Pilot Voluntary Disclosure Program

by Richard C. Call and Scott M. Susko | Feb 8, 2016 | Audits, Income Tax, Local Tax, Massachusetts, Procedure, Sales Tax

The Massachusetts Department of Revenue (the Department) released a draft administrative procedure introducing a pilot Voluntary Disclosure Program (the Program) for the settlement of uncertain tax issues for business taxpayers on January 19. The Department introduced this Program in response to a suggestion made by Scott Susko, an author of this article, and another practitioner, both of whom serve as taxpayer professional representatives on the Department’s Advisory Council. We commend the Department for reacting to this suggestion in such a proactive manner.

The Program will provide “a process through which uncertain tax issues may be resolved on an expedited basis, generally within four months” (All quotations in this post are from the Department’s draft administrative procedure).

We think this Program will be particularly helpful to public companies in resolving issues related to their financial statement reserves.

The Program defines an “uncertain tax issue” as an issue “for which there is no clear statutory guidance or controlling case law, and which has not been addressed by the Department in a regulation, letter ruling, or other public written statement,” and “for which a taxpayer would be required to maintain a reserve in accordance with ASC 740: Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (formerly Fin 48).” The issue also “must not have been addressed as part of a prior audit of the taxpayer, a prior application for abatement or amended return filed by the taxpayer, or a prior ruling request made by the taxpayer.”

To qualify for the Program, “any potential tax liability attributable to the uncertain tax issue(s) must be $100,000 or more, exclusive of interest and penalties.” A taxpayer that is under audit or has received notice of an impending audit is not eligible for the Program. The Department has the “discretion to determine that the Program is not appropriate for specific cases.”

The Department “will consider settlement of an uncertain tax issue(s) where: (1) the taxpayer has presented its position on the issue(s) and the Department agrees that the tax treatment of the issue(s) is uncertain; and (2) the taxpayer has fully disclosed and documented the issue(s) and the facts associated with that issue(s).”

A taxpayer may initiate the process by submitting an anonymous letter to the Department, which will respond to the taxpayer within 30 days. If the Department accepts the taxpayer into the Program, the taxpayer may submit an application, including a settlement proposal and identifying the taxpayer, within 45 days of receiving the Department’s acceptance letter.

The Department will waive penalties related to the uncertain tax issue for a taxpayer that reaches an agreement with the Department pursuant to the Program, as well as for a taxpayer that does not reach an agreement with the Department “provided the taxpayer acted in good faith.”

The Department requested practitioner comments on the draft administrative procedure by February 1, and MWE submitted two technical comments.

Our first comment was that following the initial evaluation, the Department should issue to the taxpayer a one-page technical position explaining whether it does or [...]

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California Supreme Court Denies BOE Petition for Review in Lucent Technologies

by McDermott Will & Emery, Eric D. Carstens and Stephen P. Kranz | Jan 26, 2016 | Audits, California, Nationwide Importance, Procedure, Sales Tax, Tax Base, Transaction Taxes

Last week, the California Supreme Court denied the State Board of Equalization’s (BOE’s) petition for review in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, No. S230657 (petition for review denied Jan. 20, 2016). This comes just months after the California Court of Appeals held against the BOE and ordered it to pay Lucent’s $25 million sales tax refund. As explained in more detail below, the denial finalizes the favorable precedent of the Court of Appeals in Nortel Networks Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 191 Cal. App. 4th 1259, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905 (2011)—representing a monumental victory for a broad range of taxpayers in California and opening the door for significant refund opportunities. Moreover, the California Supreme Court’s denial affirms the Court of Appeals decision that the BOE’s position was not substantially justified and the taxpayer was entitled to reasonable litigation costs of over $2.6 million.

Background

Lucent and AT&T (collectively Lucent) are and were global suppliers of products and services supporting, among other things, landline and wireless telephone services, the internet, and other public and private data, voice and multimedia communications networks using terrestrial and wireless technologies. Lucent manufactured and sold switching equipment (switches) to their telephone customers, which allowed the customers to provide telephone calling and other services to the end customers. The switches required software, provided on storage media, to operate. Lucent designed the software (both switch-specific and generic) that runs the switches they sell, which was copyrighted because it is an original work of authorship that has been fixed onto tapes. The software also embodies, implements and enables at least one of 18 different patents held by Lucent.

Between January 1, 1995, and September 30, 2000, Lucent entered into contracts with nine different telephone companies to: (1) sell them one or more switches; (2) provide the instructions on how to install and run those switches; (3) develop and produce a copy of the software necessary to operate those switches; and (4) grant the companies the right to copy the software onto their switch’s hard drive and thereafter to use the software (which necessarily results in the software being copied into the switch’s operating memory). Lucent gave the telephone companies the software by sending them magnetic tapes or CDs containing the software. Lucent’s placement of the software onto the tapes or discs, like the addition of any data to such physical media, physically altered those media. The telephone companies paid Lucent over $300 million for a copy of the software and for the licenses to copy and use that software on their switches.

The BOE assessed sales tax on the full amount of the licensing fees paid under the contracts between Lucent and its telephone company customers. Lucent paid the assessment and sued the BOE for a sales tax refund attributable to the software and licenses to copy and use that software at the trial court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Lucent’s refund claims, and the Los Angeles [...]

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