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New Jersey’s New Laws — Retroactive for Most Companies

A newly passed New Jersey law is interesting both for what it does and for what it does not do.  Assembly bill 3486/Senate bill 2268, attempts to “clarify” four aspects of New Jersey law (retroactively for three of the four!).  The four areas affected by the law change are:  (1) the business/non-business income distinction (called “operational/non-operational income” in New Jersey); (2) a limited partner’s eligibility for a refund of Corporation Business Tax paid on its behalf by a limited partnership; (3) net operating losses involving certain amounts related to bankruptcies, insolvencies, and qualified farm indebtedness; and (4) click-through nexus for sales and use tax purposes.

Business/Non-Business Income Distinction

The distinction between business and non-business income (called “operational” and “non-operational” income in New Jersey) is critical as it determines whether certain income (such as gain from the sale of an asset) can be apportioned among the states or instead much be allocated to only one state.  The law change expands the definition of “operational income” so that many more transactions will result in the generation of apportionable income.  In fact, the law change is estimated to increase revenue by $25 million annually.

Historically, New Jersey’s definition of business (“operational”) income included gain from sale of property “if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations. . .”  N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6.1(5)(a) (emphasis added).  Use of the conjunction “and” caused New Jersey courts to determine that all three activities (“the acquisition, management, and disposition”) must each have been integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business in order for the gain from the asset to be apportionable business (“operational”) income.  This could be overcome by demonstrating that one of the activities—usually the disposition of an asset—was not an integral part of a taxpayer’s regular trade or business.

The definition was changed, however, to replace the conjunctive “and” with the disjunctive “or” such that it will now read “the acquisition, management, and or disposition of the property constitute an integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations. . .”  Thus, because engaging in any one (or more) of those three activities as part of a taxpayer’s regular trade or business is sufficient, many more transactions will generate apportionable business income.

This provision takes effect for tax years ending after July 1, 2014.  This means that for a calendar year filer the provision takes effect retroactively for the tax year starting January 1, 2014, since the end of the year (December 1, 2014) is after July 1, 2014.  Interestingly, while the legislation refers to this change as a “clarification,” the fact that it is anticipated to increase revenue by $25 million indicates that it is, indeed, a change of law, reiterating that for the test really is a conjunctive one for prior periods.

Overturning the Result of BIS LP v. Director

There has been (and continues to be) a substantial amount of litigation in New Jersey courts regarding tax payments and tax [...]

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Division of Tax Appeals Rules Patent License Fees Not Subject to Sales Tax in New York

New York State Division of Tax Appeals administrative law judge (ALJ) recently ruled in Matter of AMO USA, Inc. on the question of whether patent license fees are properly subject to sales tax as part of the sale of tangible personal property. The ALJ determined that the patent license fees were not taxable because they were received in exchange for the right to use the taxpayer’s patents, which was a valuable, intangible right that could be sold separately from any tangible personal property.

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State and Local Tax Supreme Court Update: June 2014

On June 10, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States distributed three state and local tax cases for a conference to be held on June 26, 2014: Equifax, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue, Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, and Alabama Department of Revenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc.  The Supreme Court previously agreed to hear Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne and determine whether Maryland’s disallowance of a credit against its county income tax for taxes paid to other jurisdictions violated the Commerce Clause.  We are eager to see if the Court will opt to hear the remaining three cases, clarifying answers to questions in the world of state taxation.

The taxpayer in Equifax filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on February 19, 2014, appealing a decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court.  The state court upheld the Mississippi Department of Revenue’s application of market-based sourcing as an alternative apportionment formula instead of the statutory cost-of-performance sourcing for apportioning the income of Equifax, a credit reporting company.  In making this determination, the court required the Mississippi chancery courts to use a highly deferential standard of review.  The Institute for Professionals in Taxation, the Georgia Chamber of Commerce and the Council On State Taxation filed amicus curiae briefs.

The Direct Marketing Association filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on February 25, 2014.  The Direct Marketing Association seeks review of a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that held that the Tax Injunction Act barred federal court jurisdiction over the Direct Marketing Association’s challenge to a Colorado sales and use tax reporting law.  The law requires remote sellers that do not collect Colorado sales or use tax and have total annual gross sales in Colorado of $100,000 or more to inform the customer at the time of sale of the customer’s use tax obligation, to send annual notices to customers who purchased $500 or more in goods from the seller and to file a report with the state regarding a customer’s total purchases.  An amicus curiae brief was filed by the Council On State Taxation.  If the Supreme Court were to hear Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, it would likely clarify the holding of Hibbs v. Winn to better clarify the scope of the TIA’s protection.

On October 30, 2013, the Alabama Department of Revenue filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in CSX Transportation.  The Alabama Department of Revenue is challenging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that Alabama’s sales tax on diesel fuel discriminates against rail carriers in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) because motor carriers and interstate water carriers are not required to pay the 4 percent sales tax.  The Supreme Court had previously issued a 2011 opinion stating that the taxpayer could challenge sales and use taxes under the 4-R Act, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether the tax was discriminatory.  Amicus [...]

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Division of Tax Appeals Rules Patent License Fees not Taxable in New York

A New York State Division of Tax Appeals administrative law judge (ALJ) recently ruled in favor of a medical device and technology company represented by McDermott Will & Emery on the question of whether patent license fees that the company charged to its customers were subject to New York sales tax. In Matter of AMO USA, Inc., DTA No. 824550 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 19, 2014), the ALJ determined that the patent license fees were not taxable because they were received in exchange for the right to use the company’s patents, which was a valuable intangible right that could be sold separately from any tangible personal property.

AMO USA, Inc., (AMO) was engaged in the development, manufacture and distribution of surgical procedures and technologies involved in laser assisted corrective eye surgery, and obtained patents covering many of the methods and apparatuses used to perform the surgery.  Under United States patent law, the patents issued to AMO created an enforceable right against the unauthorized use of the patented methods and apparatuses for a limited period of time.  When AMO sold a laser directly to a physician or hospital that would operate the laser in surgical procedures, AMO also granted its consent to perform the surgical procedures covered by its patents by entering into written patent license agreements with the purchasers.  The fee that the customer paid for the right to perform AMO’s patented surgical procedures was separately stated from the charge for the equipment on the customer’s invoice; while AMO collected sales tax on the latter, it claimed that the separate fee for the patent license was exempt from sales tax.

New York imposes its sales tax on retail sales of tangible personal property but not (as a general rule) on transfers of intangible property.   Further, under New York law, the primary purpose of the transaction controls the taxability of the entire transaction, even if some parts of the transaction would be taxable and other parts would not be if they were purchased separately.  If a person makes a taxable sale of tangible personal property, the entire amount of the receipt, including any expenses incurred by the seller that are passed on to the purchaser, is subject to sales tax.

The Division of Taxation (Division) asserted that the patent license fees were not independent of the charges for tangible personal property and thus the entire transaction should have been subject to sales tax.  AMO, however, explained that the patents themselves were valuable intangible rights that could be sold separately from any tangible personal property.  The ALJ agreed with AMO, remarking that the “essential and considerable value of a patent is the intangible right vested in its owner to have exclusive authority and control over the procedure, process or apparatus for a term of years[.]”

In reaching his decision, the ALJ distinguished AMO’s case from an Advisory Opinion, TSB-A-11(32)S (Dec. 7, 2011) in which the Division had ruled that certain patent license fees paid in connection with laser eye procedures were [...]

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Louisiana Taxpayers Beware Non-Uniform Sales Tax Treatment

On June 11, 2014, the Louisiana 24th Judicial District Court held in Normand v. Cox Communications Louisiana, LLC that video-on-demand and pay-per-view programming were not subject to Jefferson Parish sales tax because they were not tangible personal property, but non-taxable services.

Prior to this case, the taxability of pay-per-view and video-on-demand programming within the local jurisdictions of Louisiana was uncertain.  While the State has taken the position that this programming is not subject to sales tax, Jefferson Parish has imposed local sales tax on these transactions.

Louisiana Revised Statutes § 47:301(16)(a) defines tangible personal property to “mean[] and include[] personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched or is in any other manner perceptible to the senses.  Louisiana Administrative Code title 61, § I.4301 includes as tangible personal property “digital or electronic products such as … ‘on demand’ audio and video downloads.”

In Revenue Information Bulletin No. 10-015, the Louisiana Department of Revenue ruled that pay-per-view and video-on-demand movies were tangible personal property subject to Louisiana sales and use tax because they were perceptible to the senses and because, while the customers do not take title to the programs, they have control over paying fees to watch the programs.  However, following pushback from the Louisiana business community, Louisiana Revenue Information Bulletin No. 10-028 temporarily suspended and No. 11-009 permanently repealed the implementation of No. 10-015 with regard to “Pay-Per-View and Video-on-Demand movies purchased for viewing by customers of cable television and satellite television providers.”   The Louisiana Department of Revenue now takes the position that Pay-Per-View and Video-on-Demand programming is not subject to Louisiana sales and use tax.

Though the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances incorporates Louisiana’s definition of “tangible personal property,” Jefferson Parish disregarded the State’s position and instead pushed for the taxation of pay-per-view and video-on-demand programming as the lease of tangible personal property.  Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances § 35-17.  Other parishes appear to be following Jefferson Parish’s lead to impose tax even though the state has said such services are exempt – and the lack of uniformity in approach to the local tax base will continue to cause problems for taxpayers.

The judge did not provide reasons for his decision, and it is unlikely that written reasons will be published unless one of the parties requests them.  It is anticipated that the case will be appealed by the parish.

Normand v. Cox Commc’ns La., L.L.C., Jefferson Parish 24th Judicial District Court, Case No. 706-766 (2014).




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Illinois Department of Revenue Intends to Extend Its Multifactor Post-Hartney Sourcing Regulations to Interstate Transactions

The saga over local sourcing of Illinois retailers’ occupation taxes is well known. The Illinois Department of Revenue has a dedicated webpage for the issue, and Inside SALT covered some of the litigation aspects last month (see Illinois Regional Transportation Authority Suffers A Setback In Its Sales Tax Sourcing Litigation).  A new chapter is unfolding now, with revised proposed local sourcing rules that would apply a multifactor sourcing analysis to both intrastate and interstate sales. The regulations may be made final as soon as next month, and retailers with complex retailing processes should consider how the rules could apply to their operations.

Background: The Illinois Department of Revenue Issued Emergency and Proposed Local Tax Sourcing Regulations after the Supreme Court of Illinois Invalidated Its Old Rules in Hartney

Illinois has perhaps the most complex sales and use tax system in the country. One driver of this complexity is the fact that the Retailers’ Occupation functions as a sales tax but is really an occupation tax measured by gross receipts – the tax imposed is on the privilege of engaging in the occupation of being a retailer. Illinois lets some local jurisdictions impose additional Retailers’ Occupation Taxes, and so the effective local rate can climb higher than the 6.25 percent statewide base rate, e.g., the 9.25 percent rate applicable in Chicago. As the tax is imposed on the business occupation rather than the sale itself, origin-based sourcing principles apply. And for out-of-state sales shipped into Illinois and not subject to Retailers’ Occupation Tax, retailers have only a use tax collection obligation at the 6.25 percent state rate.

For decades, the Department of Revenue’s regulations applied a bright-line test based on order acceptance to determine where the taxable retailing activity had occurred for local Retailers’ Occupation Tax sourcing purposes. Some taxpayers structured their operations in reliance on this approach. But the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down the bright-line order acceptance test in Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 115130 (Nov. 21, 2013), holding that an evaluation of all the retailing activities was necessary to determine where the retailing occupation occurred and consequently to which local Retailers’ Occupation Taxes a transaction was subject. The old local tax sourcing regulations were invalidated.

After Hartney, the Department promulgated new emergency local tax sourcing rules, effective January 22, 2014 (see the Department of Revenue press release, letter to Joint Committee on Administrative Rules, sample rule text). The emergency rules also served as a framework for the initial proposed final rules. These emergency and initial proposed final rules applied to intrastate tax sourcing and did not affect the Department’s longstanding rule governing whether a transaction was subject to in-state Retailers’ Occupation Tax or merely an out-of-state use tax collection obligation, 86 Ill. Admin. Code 130.610.

The Newly Revised Proposed Regulations Generally Consider Five Primary Factors in Determining the Location of the Taxable Retailing Activity

After consulting stakeholders and receiving numerous comments, the Department substantially revised [...]

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Retailers Caught in the Middle: To Tax or Not to Tax Delivery Fees

Over the past decade we have seen a large increase in the number of third party tax enforcement claims against retailers involving transaction taxes (see Multistate Tax Commission Memorandum regarding survey of class action refund claims and false action claims, dated July 12, 2013, describing such actions).  The lawsuits typically are brought either as proposed class actions, alleging an over-collection of tax, or as whistleblower claims on behalf of state governments, alleging a fraudulent under-collection of tax owed to the state or municipality.  With respect to certain issues, including shipping and handling charges, retailers have been whipsawed with lawsuits alleging both under- and over-collection of tax.

On April 3, a proposed class action lawsuit was filed in Florida alleging that Papa John’s Pizza was improperly collecting tax on its delivery fees (Schojan v. Papa John’s International, Inc., No. 14-CA-003491 (Circuit Court Hillsboro County, Florida)).  The lawsuit is similar to an action filed in Illinois that resulted in an Illinois Supreme Court ruling rejecting a proposed class action claim that a retailer was improperly collecting tax on its shipping charges (Kean v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 919 N.E.2d 926 (Illinois 2009)).

Both Florida and Illinois impose sales tax on services that are inseparably linked to the sale of tangible personal property (see, e.g., 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 130.415(b) & Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 12A-1.045(2)).  The regulations provide that whether a customer has separately contracted for shipping charges, or has an option to avoid shipping charges by picking up the property at the retailer’s location, can be used as a proxy to determine whether the services are separate and thus not taxable (86 Ill. Admin. Code § 130.415(d); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 12A-1.045(4)(a), (b)).

In Kean, the Illinois Supreme Court held that shipping charges were a taxable part of an internet sale in which the customer had no option but to pay shipping charges.  After the ruling, the Illinois Department of Revenue made no announced change to its commonly understood audit position that sales tax was not owed on separately stated shipping charges that were assessed at a retailer’s actual cost.

Seeking to capitalize on the Kean ruling, an Illinois law firm has filed upwards of 150 lawsuits under the Illinois False Claims Act against retailers that do not collect tax on the shipping and handling charges associated with their internet sales, alleging an intentional failure to collect tax and seeking treble damages, attorneys’ fees and associated penalties.  The suits were filed without regard to whether the retailers had been audited and found not to owe tax on their shipping and handling charges.  The State has declined to intervene in the majority of these cases, permitting the Relator to proceed with the prosecution.  Because the amounts at issue are small (6.25 percent tax on shipping and handling charges), the lawsuits force many retailers to choose between paying an (entirely undeserved) settlement to resolve the litigation or bearing the expense of litigation.  For reasons not entirely clear, the Illinois General Assembly [...]

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Does the Massachusetts Department of Revenue Still Believe SaaS is Subject to Sales Tax?

As noted in an earlier blog post, “[a] trend is developing in response to aggressive Department of Revenue/Treasury policy-making regarding cloud computing.”  This trend has not been friendly to aggressive Departments, and it appears that the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (Massachusetts Department) may be subtly moving away from its own aggressive position regarding one type of cloud computing transaction, software as a service (SaaS).

Following in the footsteps of the New York Department of Taxation and Finance, the Massachusetts Department has been one of the more aggressive departments in the current debate over the taxability of SaaS (see, e.g., Mass. Regs. Code 64H.1.3(3)(a); Mass. Letter Ruling 13-5 (June 4, 2013); Mass. Letter Ruling 12-13 (Nov. 09, 2012); Mass. Letter Ruling 12-10 (Sept. 25, 2012); Mass. Letter Ruling 12-6 (May 21, 2012)).  In its various letter rulings on the subject, the Massachusetts Department has routinely stated its position as follows:

Charges for prewritten software, whether it is electronically downloaded to the customer or accessed by the customer on the seller’s server (including the “Software as a Service” business model), are generally taxable. However, the marketing description of a product as “software -as-a-service” does not determine taxability of a product, nor does the fact that customers do not download software  or otherwise install software on their own computers or other devices.

The Massachusetts Department applies a “true object of the transaction” test to distinguish between situations where a transaction is for taxable software as opposed to a non-taxable service, noting in its guidance that “[w]here use of a software application is bundled with substantial non-taxable personal or professional services or non-taxable services such as database access or data processing, the object of the transaction may be the non-taxable service rather than a sale of software.”

Though the Massachusetts Department has continued to assert that charges for SaaS are generally subject to tax—both in its published guidance and during taxpayer audits—it has been over a year since the Massachusetts Department has published guidance finding that a specific SaaS offering was subject to tax (see Mass. Letter Ruling 13-5 (June 4, 2013)).  During that year, the Massachusetts Department has issued two new letter rulings, Mass. Letter Ruling 14-4 (May 29, 2014) and Mass. Letter Ruling 14-1 (Feb. 10, 2014), and revised one, Mass. Letter Ruling 12-8 (Revised Nov. 8, 2013), all of which have relied on the “object of the transaction” test to conclude that the offerings at issue were not taxable transfers of prewritten software.

In Mass. Letter Ruling 14-4, the Massachusetts Department considered the requestor’s SaaS offering through which it provided customers with remote access to interactive training programs hosted on its servers, seemingly a ripe fact pattern for finding that the true object of the transaction was prewritten software, especially in light of the Massachusetts Department’s position in other letter rulings (see, e.g., Mass. Letter Ruling 12-10, finding the true object of a SaaS transaction to be the underlying software, noting that “the customer must interact with the software in [...]

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Illinois Legislative Tax Policy Subcommittees Issue Joint Report on Findings

On May 28, 2014, the Tax Policy Subcommittees of the Illinois General Assembly’s Joint Revenue and Finance and State Government Administration Committees (Subcommittees) issued their long-awaited Report on Findings regarding the State of Illinois (Report).  The Report was generated after months of hearings and solicitation of written comments from interested parties with respect to Illinois tax rates, tax incentives and tax policy issues.

The Report is chock full of facts and figures.  Unfortunately, it fails to offer much clear direction for the state, as the members of the Subcommittees were unable to agree on the majority of the issues considered.  For example, the Report provides that the state should “continue to explore” the question of whether Illinois should apply the sales tax to services, as do many surrounding states.  Similarly, the Report concludes that while most members of the Subcommittees believe that the corporate income tax rate should be reduced, they could not agree on the amount of the reduction, what corresponding cuts in state spending would offset such a reduction, or even whether the Illinois personal property replacement tax should be considered as part of the corporate income tax rate when comparing Illinois’ income tax rates to those of other states.  The Report also concludes that the Subcommittees are “strongly interested” in providing sales tax exemptions to customers who provide data centers in Illinois, but has not come to a consensus about how to move forward with that process.  The Subcommittees also failed to reach a consensus regarding any changes needed to the Economic Development for a Growing Economy credit, instead offering only the platitude that “it is imperative to ensure that Illinois remains competitive in today’s economy.”

The Report does, however, contain the following findings:

  1. In its most definitive finding, the Report recommends the elimination of the Illinois franchise tax.  No specific plan or timetable is put forward for the elimination of this tax.
  2. The Report concludes that Illinois’ eligibility criteria for the research and development (R&D) tax credit should be changed to match the federal requirements.  For instance, the federal alternative simplified R&D credit would require that R&D spending exceed 50 percent (instead of 100 percent) of the previous three year average.
  3. The Report concludes that initial filing fees for LLCs should be reduced.  No consensus was reached regarding the amount of the reduction.
  4. The Report recommends that the state streamline current processes by designating a point person to help businesses seeking the state’s help with respect to job creation, retention and relocation in Illinois.

In what appears to be an effort to boost the state’s image in the business community, the Report also references a number of favorable statements about Illinois’ business climate that the Report attributes to various business publications.  The Report touts that Illinois ranks third in corporate expansions, according to Site Selection Magazine, that Illinois was identified as among the top five states for “technology and innovation” and “infrastructure” according to CNBC Top States for Business 2013 [...]

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Michigan Appeals Court Reaffirms True Object Test for Remote Access Software

In Thomson Reuters, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, No. 313825 (Mich. Ct. App. May 13, 2014) (unpublished), the Michigan Court of Appeals, reversing the ruling of the Court of Claims, held that a taxpayer’s sale of online research products was not subject to Michigan use tax.  The court held that the transaction was not taxable because it was the sale of a nontaxable service and not the sale of taxable tangible personal property.

The taxpayer sold numerous information products, including subscriptions to its research platform Checkpoint.  Checkpoint is a product of particular interest to state tax practitioners as many of us use it for research.  For the uninitiated, Checkpoint is an online tax and accounting research program that provides subscribers with access, via a web browser, to court cases, rulings and other information that is compiled, synthesized and organized by Checkpoint’s content creators from multiple up-to-date sources.

The Michigan Department of Treasury determined that the taxpayer’s sales of Checkpoint subscriptions constituted the taxable sale of “prewritten computer software” and were therefore taxable.  The taxpayer argued that the sale of subscriptions to Checkpoint constituted the nontaxable sale of an information service and, alternatively, even if tangible personal property was transferred, the sale was nonetheless “primarily” the sale of a service.  The Court of Claims granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment and held that the sales were taxable.

The taxpayer appealed and the Court of Appeals overturned the Court of Claims decision.  The Court of Appeals found that the taxpayer’s transfer of tangible personal property was incidental to the service that the taxpayer provided, and thus the transaction as a whole was not taxable.  The Court of Appeals applied the test established by the Michigan Supreme Court in Catalina Marketing Sales Corp. v. Dept. of Treasury.  678 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 2004).  Under the Catalina test, a court must objectively analyze the entire transaction and determine whether the transaction is “principally” the transfer of tangible personal property or the transfer of services with a transfer of tangible personal property that is incidental to the service.  Applying the test in this case, the Court of Appeals found that Checkpoint subscribers were not seeking the software underlying the product, but rather were primarily seeking access to up-to-date information relevant to their research needs and benefited from the expert knowledge of Checkpoint’s content creators which rendered the customers’ research more efficient.

This is the second decision out of Michigan regarding the Catalina test.  In Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Dept. of Treasury, Case No. 12-000082-MT (Mich.Ct.Claims Mar. 20, 2014), the Michigan Court of Claims held that certain remote software access transactions were not subject to use tax because they were nontaxable services, not the transfer of software.  The Court of Claims held that under the statute, which applied use tax to software “delivered by any means,” the taxpayer’s products were not taxable because the software was not delivered.  Although the transactions were not taxable under this interpretation, the Court of Claims went on to [...]

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