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In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
INSIDE SALT
In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
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Straight Outta Delaware: JLI Invest S.A. et al. v. Cook et al.

by , and | Aug 25, 2015 | , , , ,

As soon as we start to think that Delaware’s unclaimed property practices and administration couldn’t possibly get any more egregious, another lawsuit like JLI Invest S.A. et al. v. Cook et al., Case No. 11274 surfaces. The facts alleged in the complaint highlight the fundamental issue of just how much “protection” state unclaimed property laws provide to owners. In this case, Delaware apparently protected two scientists out of $12,024,148.25. Yay Delaware. The scientists are not happy (we would be crying on the floor with either (a) a vat of Graeter’s ice cream or (b) a barrel of Sancerre) and have sued Delaware for their lost value.

Facts

Dr. Gilles Gosselin and Dr. Jean Louis Imbach are the two Belgian scientists who headed the research team responsible for creating a Hepatitis B drug. Idenix Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was established to commercially develop this drug. As the creators of the drug, Dr. Gosselin and Dr. Imbach were given an ownership interest amounting to approximately 10 percent of the Idenix shares. These shares were held by JLI Invest S.A. and LIN Invest S.A. (the plaintiffs), two Belgian companies established for this purpose.

Despite the facts that (a) both Idenix and Computershare (their transfer agent) had record of the mailing address of each plaintiff and no mail was ever returned undeliverable—as required by Delaware law at the time for property to be deemed abandoned— and (b) that scientists both continued to perform professional services for Idenix, Computershare reported the Idenix shares to Delaware in November 2008 and delivered all of the shares to Delaware on January 2, 2009.  Three days later, Delaware sold the shares for a total of $1,695,851.75 (approximately $3.03 per share). At the time, Idenix had approximately 50 shareholders, and the market for the shares was illiquid.

After making an inquiry concerning the stock to Computershare three years later in 2012, the plaintiffs learned that their shares had been escheated to Delaware. Upon contacting the Delaware Office of Unclaimed Property to claim their property, the plaintiffs were forced to provide substantial documentation verifying their status as the rightful owner, which they did in October and December 2012. After over a year of “pending” status, the plaintiffs were directed to complete a “Request Form” in May 2013, at which time it was noted that a response could take another 12 weeks.

On June 9, 2014, Merck and Idenix announced that Merck would acquire Idenix via a cash tender offer for $24.50 per share. Because the plaintiffs’ shares had been escheated to (and immediately sold by) Delaware in 2009, they were not able to participate in the tender offer despite their desire to. Had they been able to participate, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to receive a total of $13,720,000 for their shares. Meanwhile, Delaware had still not responded regarding the status of their claim. Notably, it was not until October 2014 (over two years after their initial request) that the Delaware Office of Unclaimed Property confirmed that the plaintiffs Idenix shares were [...]

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Uniform Law Commission Completes First Reading of the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act

by , and | Jul 20, 2015 | , , ,

On Tuesday, July 14, 2015, at their Annual Meeting the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) completed their first reading of the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (RUUPA or the Act). While over half of the sections comprising the current draft of the Act were passed over due to strict time constraints imposed by the ULC President Harriet Lansing, the RUUPA Drafting Committee (Committee) did their best to focus the time they did have on sections they felt were most in need of feedback from the ULC Commissioners (Commissioners) as a whole. The Committee even went so far as to invite discussion by allowing American Bar Association (ABA) Advisors and National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators (NAUPA) to explain their stances on hot button issues such as the derivative rights doctrine, life insurance provisions and the inclusion of a business-to-business exemption. Despite this attempt, Commissioner feedback was sparse (to non-existent) for a majority of the reading and was often technical in nature when provided. While over 250 of the 400 Commissioners were present at the Annual Meeting, only about half of those present attended the morning session of the RUUPA reading. After a lunch break, the afternoon session of the reading was even more sparsely attended, with less than 100 Commissioners present. While the turnout and participation was not ideal, the Committee provided some guidance to the Commissioners that may be useful to interested parties going forward.

Highlights

  • Committee Co-Chair Rex Blackburn made it clear that they would be considering the application of the derivative right doctrine, which generally stands for the proposition that state unclaimed property administrators cannot receive greater rights than those of the true owner, on a property-type basis (as opposed to a blanket inclusion or exclusion). Aside from the short ABA-NAUPA debate on the issue, there was no substantive discussion of the derivate rights doctrine.
  • A return to the 1981 Act’s 10-year statute of repose was discussed. Commissioner Raymond Pepe noted that the Committee reverted back to this based on the widespread abuse of statistical sampling. Several Commissioners were supportive of this change, and even encouraged the Committee to shorten this period further since the statute does not begin running until after the report was due. Nebraska Commissioner Harvey Perlman suggested that the Committee simply limit the use of abusive statistical sampling instead of establishing a statute of repose. The Committee responded that a bright-line rule is necessary here to provide certainty.
  • The Committee confessed that the current section on the conduct of audits (Section 20) needs to be broken out into four distinct sections in the next draft. A majority of the discussion in this area was on the use of contingent fee contract auditors—which is permitted in the current draft with numerous protections that seek to enhance the transparency of this process. Connecticut Commissioner David Biklen suggested that his state would not be able to audit holders without the use of contract auditors and expressed concern [...]

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Delaware Senate Passes Unclaimed Property Reform Bill

by , and | Jun 23, 2015 | , , , ,

On June 18, 2015, a bill (S.B. 141) was unanimously approved by the Delaware Senate that would place limits on the look-back period and permanently extend the Voluntary Disclosure Agreement (VDA) program. This represents the second bill this year that seeks to implement the recommended changes contained in the Unclaimed Property Task Force’s (Task Force) December 2014 final report (the first, S.B. 11, was signed by Governor Jack Markell on January 29, 2015). If passed by the House, the legislation would offer several additional protections to holders; however, it also contains a number of traps for the unwary that should not be overlooked.

Look-back Period Shortened

First, and most significantly, the bill would limit the examination look-back period in Delaware to 22 years, starting in 2017. For periods before 2017, the bill would limit the look-back period to 1986 (if currently under examination) or 1991 (for any examinations initiated after enactment).  While this proposed look-back period decrease would be a significant improvement from the status quo (which allows Delaware to look-back to any period after 1980), it would still represent one of the longer look-back periods in the country. Notably, the proposed 22-year look-back period would remain over twice as long as most state unclaimed property look-back periods (which are usually 10 years or less).

Permanent VDA Program

Second, the VDA program is amended to authorize the Secretary of State to request that any potential holder enter into an unclaimed property VDA. If the potential holder does not agree to the VDA within 60 days, they will be referred to the State Escheator for examination. The bill provides for a 19-year (reduced) look-back period for any holder than enters the VDA program on or after January 1, 2017, and allows two years to complete the VDA process. Additionally, S.B. 141 would strike the sunset provision for the VDA program, which is currently scheduled to expire July 1, 2016. Certain holders are not permitted to participate in the VDA program, including those that: (1) formally withdrew from the voluntary disclosure agreement program, or (2) were removed from the VDA program for failure to work in good faith to complete the VDA program as soon as practicable.

Interest

The bill would also amend the governing statute to allow interest of 0.5 percent per month (up to 25 percent of the amount due) to accrue from the due date for any late-filed unclaimed property reported and remitted on or after March 1, 2016. The current unclaimed property statute in Delaware does not have a provision permitting the accrual of interest (former interest provisions were repealed in June 2014 with the enactment of S.B. 228). Even before their repeal, the interest provisions were largely unenforced. Because the look-back period would remain over 20 years in Delaware, the added costs associated with the proposed interest increase (and actual enforcement) will likely be more than the amounts no longer owed due to the proposed look-back period reduction.

Mandatory Holder Contact

One procedural change [...]

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Massachusetts DOR May Lose Staff This Summer

by and | May 26, 2015 | , ,

The Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR) likely will have significantly less employees starting July 1, 2015, due to a Massachusetts employee retirement incentive program.  Governor Charlie Baker recently signed legislation establishing the program on May 4, 2015 (see 2015 Mass. Acts Chapter 19, An Act Relative to State Personnel).  With more than half of DOR’s employees eligible to participate in the program, DOR is the state agency with the potential to lose the highest percentage of employees.

The program allows employees who already are eligible to retire but have not reached their maximum pension benefit to add up to five years onto their age, years of service or a combination of both, so they can retire immediately with a higher pension.  The program limits total workforce reductions in Massachusetts to 5,000 employees.  Eligible employees must submit an application to the State Board of Retirement between May 11 and June 12, 2015, to participate.  The retirement date and last day of work for approved employees will be June 30, 2015.  The Baker administration can use up to 20 percent of the savings from the retired employees to hire replacement staff, but it is unclear when such hiring will take place and how much funding will be allocated to DOR versus other state agencies affected by the program.

What does this mean for taxpayers and tax practitioners?  We are hearing that there may be a potential shortage of staff at DOR, particularly in the Audit Division.  Audits may be slowed and relationships that have been developed over years with auditors may end abruptly.  Consequently, taxpayers and their representatives might aim to quickly resolve any matters they have outstanding with DOR sooner rather than later as DOR may be forced to slow down following the reduction in staff this summer.

It is unclear what effect the program will have on the Litigation Bureau and other sections of DOR.  A loss of litigators could slow cases currently before the Appellate Tax Board.

Although disagreements may exist with various DOR positions, we are pleased with the institutional strength of DOR.  We hope that steps will be taken to retain the institutional knowledge of long time DOR personnel.



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A Year’s Review of Massachusetts Tax Cases

by and | May 14, 2015 | , , , ,

Allied Domecq Spirits & Wines USA, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1125 (2014)

In a unique case, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed a ruling of the Appellate Tax Board (ATB) that two corporations could not be combined for corporation excise tax purposes for 1996 through 2004. The distinctive aspect of this case was that a company was found not to have nexus with Massachusetts even though it rented property in the state and had employees in the state. If the company had been found to have nexus, it could have applied its losses to offset the income of an affiliated Massachusetts taxpayer in a combined report. The Appeals Court pointed to factual findings of the ATB that the transfer of employees located in Massachusetts to the company “had no practical economic effect other than the creation of a tax benefit and that tax avoidance was its motivating factor and only purpose.” The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the taxpayer further review on August 1, 2014. Although this case is notable because the sham transaction doctrine rarely, if ever, has been applied to find that a company did not have nexus, a similar factual scenario likely would not occur today because Massachusetts adopted full unitary combination in 2009.

First Marblehead Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 470 Mass. 497, 23 N.E.3d 892 (2015)

In a case that attracted the attention of, and an amicus brief from, the Multistate Tax Commission, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed how the property factor of a taxpayer subject to the Financial Institution Excise Tax (FIET) should be apportioned. The taxpayer, Gate Holdings, Inc. (Gate), had its commercial domicile in Massachusetts and held interests in a number of Delaware statutory trusts that purchased student loan portfolios. Below, the ATB held that Gate’s loans should be assigned to Massachusetts, resulting in a 100-percent property factor for apportionment purposes. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and interpreted the Massachusetts sourcing provisions at issue, which are based on a model from the Multistate Tax Commission and incorporate the Solicitation, Investigation, Negotiation, Approval and Administration (SINAA) rules, as sourcing Gate’s loans to Massachusetts where Gates had its commercial domicile. The Supreme Judicial Court’s decision may be of interest in Massachusetts and other states because several states have adopted sourcing rules for financial institutions that are based on the Multistate Tax Commission’s model.

Genentech, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Mass. App. Tax Bd., Docket No. C282905, C293424, C298502, C298891 (2014)

The ATB held that Genentech, Inc., a biotechnology company, was engaged in substantial manufacturing and thus required to use single sales factor apportionment. Genentech is appealing the ruling.

National Grid Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Mass. App. Tax Bd., Docket No.  C292287; C292288; C292289 (2014); National Grid USA Service v. Comm’r of Revenue, Mass. App. Tax Bd., Docket No. C314926 (2014)

The ATB addressed whether an international utility corporation’s deferred subscription arrangements constituted debt for corporate excise purposes. The ATB held that it did not. In reaching its decision, [...]

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Plain and Simple: Maryland Tax Court Holds Insurance Company is Exempt from Corporate Income Taxes

by | May 13, 2015 | , , ,

Although taxpayers often complain that complying with the tax laws imposed by the numerous state and local taxing jurisdictions that exist in the United States is a burdensome process, many of these tax statutes also provide benefits to taxpayers in the form of exemptions, deductions and credits.  Taxpayers who structure their affairs according to the plain language of these favorable tax laws can be frustrated when state revenue departments attempt to deny them the benefits of the statute.  A recent opinion from the Maryland Tax Court supports the argument commonly advanced by taxpayers in these situations – that when the language of a statute is clear, there is no room for the revenue department to interpret the statute in a contrary manner.  See National Indemnity Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Dkt. No. 14-IN-OO-0433 (Md. Tax Ct. April 24, 2015).

Maryland, like many states, exempts “insurance companies” from the payment of corporate income taxes because these entities are generally subject to tax under some other section of the tax law, insurance law or both.  Also as in many states, insurance companies are defined for purposes of Maryland’s corporate income tax statutes by reference to the state’s insurance law.  The taxpayer in National Indemnity Co. plainly fit within the definition of an insurance company under the Maryland insurance statutes because it was “in the business of writing insurance contracts.”  See Md. Code Insurance § 6-101(a).  While the facts of the case do not disclose whether the company did in fact pay taxes under a different statute, insurance companies in Maryland are subject to tax on all new and renewal gross direct premiums that are allocable to the state and written during the preceding calendar year.  See Md. Code Insurance § 6-102.  Nevertheless, the Maryland Comptroller’s office contended that when an insurance company invests money similar to a commercial bank, it should not be afforded the statutory exemption from corporate income tax.  The Tax Court rejected the Comptroller’s argument, noting that under the plain language of the statute (as well as under the Comptroller’s regulations and other published guidance), insurance companies similar to the taxpayer were not subject to Maryland corporate income tax.

In National Indemnity, Maryland’s corporate income tax statute clearly exempted insurance companies from the payment of corporate income taxes, and clearly defined insurance companies by reference to the Maryland insurance law.  The Comptroller’s argument appeared to be that, despite the fact that the taxpayer at issue fit within the statutory definition of an insurance company, it wasn’t “acting like” an insurance company and therefore shouldn’t be taxed like an insurance company.  While the National Indemnity opinion is short, its import is clear—where the legislature has plainly spoken on a subject, the revenue department is obligated to follow the plain language of the statute, whether that statute is favorable to the revenue department or not.  Companies should also be aware that Maryland (like a number of other states) does allow the prevailing party in a civil [...]

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D.C. Proposes Law to Allow Indefinite Suspension of Limitation Period for Assessment and Collection

by , and | May 6, 2015 | , , , , ,

The Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Support Act of 2015 (BSA), introduced by the Washington, D.C. Council at the request of Mayor Muriel Bowser on April 2, 2015, contains a subtitle (see Title VII, Subtitle G, page 66-67) that would give the Office and Tax and Revenue (OTR) complete discretion to indefinitely suspend the period of limitation on assessment and collection of all D.C. taxes—other than real property taxes, which contain a separate set of rules and procedures. The change to the statute of limitation provision would eliminate a fundamental taxpayer protection that exists today in all states. Those concerned should reach out to members of the D.C. Council to discourage adoption of this subtitle of the BSA.

Current Law

Under current law, the amount of tax imposed must be assessed (in other words, a final assessment must be issued) within three (3) years of the taxpayer’s return being filed. See D.C. Code § 47-4301(a). Practically speaking, this requires the mayor to issue a notice of proposed assessment no later than two (2) years and 11 months after the return is filed—to allow the taxpayer the requisite 30 days to file a protest with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). See D.C. Code § 47-4312(a). As the law reads today, the running of the period of limitation is suspended between the filing of a protest and the issuance of a final order by OAH, plus an additional 60 days thereafter. See D.C. Code § 47-4303. The District has 10 years after the final assessment to levy or begin a court proceeding for collections. See D.C. Code § 47-4302(a).

Proposed Changes

The BSA would extend the limitation period for assessment and collection, as follows:

  1. The BSA would add a new provision to statutorily require the chief financial officer (CFO, the executive branch official overseeing the OTR) to send a notice of proposed audit changes at least 30 days before the notice of proposed assessment is sent; and
  2. The BSA would toll the running of the statute of limitation on assessment and collection during the period after the CFO/OTR issues the aforementioned notice of proposed audit changes until the issuance of a final assessment or order by OAH.

The BSA does not indicate an applicable date for these changes. As a result, the provision likely would be applicable to any open tax period, effectively making the change retroactive to returns already filed.

Effect

By changing the law to toll the statute of limitation for the period after OTR issues a notice of proposed audit changes, the BSA would allow OTR to unilaterally control whether the three-year statute of limitation is running. The current statute requires that OTR issue its notice of proposed assessment before the expiration of the three-year statute—and gives taxpayers the ability to protest such notices before the OAH. By tolling the statute upon issuance of a notice of proposed audit changes, which is not subject to review by OAH, the BSA would strip taxpayers of the [...]

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Reporting Audit Changes – New York City Amends Provision on Apportionment

by | May 6, 2015 | , , , ,

On April 13, 2015, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law two bills related to the 2015-2016 budget (S2009-B/A3009-B and S4610-A/A6721-A) (Budget Bill), containing several significant “technical corrections” to the New York State corporate income tax reform enacted in 2014, along with sales tax provisions and amendments to reform New York City’s (the City’s) General Corporation tax.  For additional information regarding these changes see our Special Report.

One of the less-publicized changes to the New York City Administrative Code involves an amendment to the provision that prohibits changes to the City allocation percentage during the additional period of limitation that is initiated by the reporting of federal or New York State corporate income tax or certain sales and use tax changes to the City where a taxpayer is not conceding the reported changes for New York City purposes.  N.Y. Admin. Code § 11-674(3)(g).  Under the former rule, if the general three-year statute of limitations had expired (i.e., the three-year period from the date the City return was filed), neither the taxpayer nor the City could make changes to the taxpayer’s allocation percentage due to the reporting of federal or New York State changes.  (This same prohibition on changes to the allocation percentage applied (a) when the taxpayer had not notified the City as to a federal or New York State change, but in such situation there would be no limitation on the time period during which the City can issue an assessment and (b) when a deficiency was attributable to the application of a net operating loss or capital loss carry back.)

In the past, the Commissioner has argued that the language in section 11-674(3)(g) was only intended to bar the City from making its own audit adjustments to a taxpayer’s allocation percentage and did not bar the City from making changes to a taxpayer’s allocation percentage that track or reflect State changes to such percentage.  A 1991 Department of Finance Hearing Decision agreed with this interpretation.  See Matter of C.I.C. International Corporation, FHD(390)-GC-9/91(0-0-0) (Sept. 13, 1991).  However, in 1999, the New York City Tax Appeals Tribunal held that the limitation imposed by section 11-674(3)(g) barred the City from making any changes to a taxpayer’s allocation percentage during the additional two-year period of limitation following a report of a State change, even if those changes were merely employed to mirror State changes.  Matter of Ethyl Corporation, New York City Tax Appeals Tribunal, TAT(E)93-97(GC) (June 28, 1999).

In this year’s Budget Bill, the limitation provision was amended with respect to taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2015 (the provision was not changed for taxable periods beginning before January 1, 2015).  For taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2015, the City may adjust the allocation percentage within the additional period of limitation when the New York City assessment is based on the reporting of a New York State change.  (The prohibition on changes to the allocation percentage still remains with respect to the reporting of federal [...]

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SCOTUS: Colorado Notice and Reporting Challenge Not Barred by the Tax Injunction Act

by , and | Mar 3, 2015 | , , , , ,

The United States Supreme Court released a unanimous decision today holding that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1391, does not bar suit in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of Colorado notice and reporting requirements imposed on noncollecting out-of-state retailers. See Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, No. 13-1032, 575 U.S. ___ (March 3, 2015), available here. These requirements, enacted in 2010, require retailers to (1) notify Colorado purchasers that tax is due on their purchases; (2) send annual notices to Colorado customers who purchased more than $500 in goods in the preceding year, “reminding” these purchasers of their obligation to pay sales tax to the state; and (3) report information on Colorado purchasers to the state’s tax authorities. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5). The TIA provides that federal district courts “shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law.”

The Court’s Opinion

The Court held that although the notice and reporting requirements are part of Colorado’s overall assessment and collection process, none of the requirements constitute an “assessment,” “levy,” or “collection” within the meaning of the TIA. Specifically, the Court looked to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to determine that the terms are “discrete phrases of the taxation process that do not include informational notice or private reports of information relevant to tax liability.” See Slip Op. at 5-8 (noting that no “assessment” or “collection” within the meaning of the IRC occurs until there is a recording of the amount the taxpayer owes the Government, which the notice and reporting requirements precede).  Justice Thomas, who authored the opinion, concluded that “[t]he TIA is keyed to the acts of assessment, levy, and collection themselves, and enforcement of the notice and reporting requirements is none of these.” Id. at 9.

The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on (and expansive interpretation of) the term “restrain” in the TIA.  Justice Thomas explained that such a broad reading of the statute would “defeat the precision” of the specifically enumerated terms and allow courts to expand the TIA beyond its statutory meaning to “virtually any court action related to any phase of taxation.” Id. at 11.  Instead, he assigned the same meaning to “restrain” that it has in equity for TIA purposes, which is consistent with its roots and the Anti-Injunction Act (the TIA’s federal counterpart).  Therefore, the Court concluded that “a suit cannot be understood to ‘restrain’ the ‘assessment, levy or collection’ of a state tax if it merely inhibits those activities.” Id. at 12.

The Court’s decision took “no position on whether a suit such as this one might nevertheless be barred under the ‘comity doctrine,’” under which federal courts – as a matter of discretion, not jurisdiction – refrain from “interfering with the fiscal operations of the state governments in all cases where the Federal rights of persons could otherwise be preserved unimpaired.” Id. at 13. The Court left it to the Tenth Circuit on remand [...]

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Beleaguered D.C. Taxpayers Achieve Another Success in Ongoing Challenges to the Methodology Used in the District’s Transfer Pricing Audit Program

by , and | Nov 20, 2014 | , , , ,

On Friday, November 14, 2014, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued three identical orders granting the taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment in Hess v. OTR, Shell v. OTR and ExxonMobil v. OTR.  In these orders, the ALJ determined that based on an early ruling that the challenged methodology was fatally flawed, the Office of Tax and Revenue was barred from re-litigating the issue in the current cases under the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel.

Transfer Pricing Implications

The transfer pricing litigation in D.C. has been a frustrating road for taxpayers because the flaws in the methodology OTR applied have been apparent from the outset.  The first case to be litigated was Microsoft v. OTR, OAH Case. No. 2010-OTR-00012 (May 1, 2012).  In this case, an ALJ ruled that the methodology the District used was fatally flawed because the methodology  failed to (i) separate controlled from uncontrolled transactions and (ii) individually analyze different product lines and different functions.  As a result, the ALJ concluded that the analysis was flawed, arbitrary and unreasonable.  OTR initially appealed the Microsoft order to the D.C. Court of Appeals, only to withdraw shortly after by filing a motion to dismiss its own petition for review.

When Microsoft was decided in 2012, it appeared that the faulty transfer pricing methods used by the District had been permanently debunked.  Nevertheless, OTR renewed the contract for the business performing the transfer pricing audits and did not materially modify the assessment methods.  As a result, taxpayers continued receiving assessments from the OTR based on the same methodology previously ruled invalid in Microsoft.  At least 10 taxpayers have challenged these assessments post-Microsoft, and the orders issued Friday are the first of these challenges to be resolved by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

The taxpayers in the Hess/Shell/ExxonMobil cases all challenged the substantive validity of the assessment methodology and argued that the Microsoft decision should be controlling.  OTR asserted that the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel did not apply to the government and, even if it did, the elements were not met in this case.  The ALJ disagreed with OTR’s analysis and found “the failure to apply [non-mutual collateral estoppel] would allow [DC] to keep issuing proposed assessments to taxpayers using the same flawed Chainbridge analysis, with the hope that some taxpayers won’t have the wherewithal to challenge the assessment and will find it economically advantageous to simply pay rather than fight.”

The three orders issued on Friday should provide a definitive signal to OTR that the method is flawed as a matter of law and cannot be validly used to assess D.C. taxpayers going forward.  These decisions are essentially decisions on the merits for the pending cases and, assuming no appeal is filed, D.C. should face sanctions if it continues to pursue assessments using the methodology at issue in these cases.

Broad Implications

Perhaps more importantly than the narrow (but important) transfer pricing issue in these decisions, OAH has made is clear that non-mutual collateral estoppel can be applied against OTR [...]

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