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Alenia Decision May Benefit D.C. Corporate Taxpayers

The recent decision in Alenia N. America, Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue in the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) could present opportunities for District taxpayers to receive corporate franchise tax refunds by including their joint ventures’ apportionment factors in the taxpayers’ District apportionment percentage calculation.  Alenia N. America v. District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue, Dkt. 2012-OTR-00015 (D.C. O.A.H.  Mar. 11, 2014).

Through an unwritten, internal policy, the District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue (OTR) prohibited separate filers from including the apportionment factors of joint ventures in which a taxpayer was a member/partner in the apportionment percentage calculation while permitting consolidated filers to do so.  Alenia N. America challenged this interpretation of the District’s apportionment formula, filing a protest in OAH.  Alenia is a separate filer C Corporation headquartered in the District.  A portion of Alenia’s 2010 tax year income resulted from its 51 percent ownership in a Mississippi LLC, Global Military Aircraft Systems (GMAS).  Because OTR required Alenia to include the income resulting from ownership of GMAS in its apportionable tax base but exclude the apportionment factors of GMAS, Alenia’s District apportionment percentage increased from 55.1899 percent to 86.1993 percent.  OTR effectively asserted the power of taxation over income derived from sources outside of the District.

OAH granted a summary decision in favor of Alenia, holding that GMAS’ apportionment factors could be included by Alenia because Alenia and GMAS were unitary and the District’s apportionment statute was designed with the purpose to create uniformity; most states applying formulaic apportionment allow for the inclusion of the apportionment factors (see Homart Development Co. v. Norberg, 529 A.2d 115 (R.I. 1987); Malpass v. Dep’t of Treasury, 494 Mich. 237, 833 N.W.2d 272 (2013)); and factor inclusion was necessary to reflect the source of the GMAS income.  Reading the District’s apportionment statute, D.C. Code § 47-1810.02, “consistently with its constitutional underpinnings and its general purpose to promote uniformity” overcame the silence as to whether the inclusion of factors applied to separate filers.  OTR’s misinterpretation of District law was “in conflict with the statute.” Alenia, Dkt. 2012-OTR-00015 at *26.

In light of the holding in Alenia allowing for the inclusion of the apportionment factors of joint ventures, taxpayers should consider whether District refunds are now available to them.  Further, an argument can be made that the holding in Alenia continues to apply despite the District’s switch to a combined reporting regime because of the court’s insistence that factor inclusion is necessary to reflect the source of the taxpayer’s income.

For a copy of the decision, contact one of the authors.




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Retroactive Revenue Raisers: A Taxpayer Win in New York; Problems Ahead in Virginia

When state legislatures are in need of additional funds – as they often are – it is tempting to enact retroactive legislation to bring more dollars into state coffers. Two recent developments have Due Process Clause questions of retroactivity back in the news in the SALT world. In Caprio v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., No. 651176/11, 2014 NY Slip Op. 02399 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 8, 2014), a New York court rejected a retroactive amendment reaching back three years into the past. Virginia, however, recently amended its add-back statute (H.B. 5001, § 3-5.11) with an even longer retroactive period of 10 years.

New York’s Three and a Half Year Retroactive Tax Struck Down As-Applied

In Caprio, Florida residents sold their stock in a New Jersey S corporation in exchange for an installment note. The S corporation was a janitorial services company that also did business in New York. The parties to the transaction made an IRC § 338(h)(10) election for treatment as a deemed asset sale, with the installment note thereby deemed to be distributed in liquidation to the shareholders. When the shareholders subsequently received payments on the installment note, they did not report any New York source income because they treated the payments as gain from the sale of stock, not sourced to New York any more than would be a sale of stock in a Fortune 500 company.

Treatment of gain from a nonresident’s sale of S corporation stock as not sourced to New York was upheld by the New York State Division of Tax Appeals in In re Mintz, DTA nos. 821807, 821806 (Jun. 4, 2009) (for a detailed discussion in Mintz, see Inside New York Taxes), but retroactive legislation in 2010 reversed the result. 2010 N.Y. Laws, c. 57, Part C (amending N.Y. Tax Law § 632(a)(2)).  Caprio voids the retroactive application of the 2010 amendment to the taxpayers as violating the Due Process Clause.

Applying New York’s three-factor test set forth in James Square Assoc. LP v. Mullen, 993 N.E.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. 2013), aff ’g, 91 A.D.3d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th 2011) (which we discussed recently in State Tax Notes), the Appellate Division considered the factors of (1) taxpayer’s forewarning and the reasonableness of the retroactive change, (2) the length of the retroactive period, and (3) the public purpose of the retroactivity. The majority concluded that the 2010 amendment was unconstitutionally retroactive:

  • The taxpayers had no actual forewarning of the 2010 amendment at the time they entered into the transaction, and they reasonably relied on the law as it existed to structure the sale;
  • A three and a half year retroactive period was excessive; and
  • Raising $30 million for the state budget was not a sufficiently compelling public purpose.

The Questionable Validity of Virginia’s 10 Year Retroactive Add-Back Amendments

Just before Caprio came down, Virginia amended its add-back statute, retroactive to 2004, to narrow the subject-to-tax and conduit exceptions. See [...]

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Multistate Tax Commission Appoints Keith Getschel as Director of Joint Audit Program

Beginning June 16, Keith Getschel will succeed Les Koenig as the Director of the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) Joint Audit Program.  Les Koenig is retiring as of July 31.  Mr. Getschel comes from the Minnesota Department of Revenue, having held the position of Assistant Commissioner for Business Taxes since 2012.  Mr. Getschel has worked in the Minnesota Department of Revenue for over 30 years, holding such positions as Director of Corporate Tax and Assistant Director in the Corporate and Sales Tax Division.  He also has experience as a supervisor in the Tax Operations Division, a tax policy manager, a revenue tax specialist in the Amended Returns Unit, and an appeals officer in the Appeals and Legal Services Division.

The MTC Joint Audit Program performs audits on behalf of participating states.  The program engages in audits of taxpayers simultaneously across multiple states, conserving state funds and time.  Mr. Getschel’s reputation as a tax administrator in the Minnesota Department of Revenue makes him a great fit for this position.  He has been viewed as taxpayer friendly and willing to work cooperatively with taxpayers to resolve issues.  We hope he continues this trend at the MTC.




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Oklahoma Supreme Court KOs the Constitution

On April 22, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma released its opinion in CDR Systems Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission.  Case No. 109,886; 2014 OK 31.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court, overturning the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, held that an Oklahoma statute, which grants a deduction for income from gains that result from the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of an “Oklahoma company,” is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.  “Oklahoma company” is defined as an entity that has had its primary headquarters in Oklahoma for at least three uninterrupted years prior to the date of the taxable transaction.

In a 5-4 decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that there was no discrimination against out-of-state commerce.  Even if there was discrimination, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the statute does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, does not have a discriminatory purpose and has no discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reasoning was based in part on the conclusion that the statute treated all taxpayers the same.

In his dissent, Justice Combs reached the opposite conclusion and wrote that the deduction is unconstitutional because the primary headquarters requirement is based upon the level of business a company conducts in Oklahoma, and therefore it discriminates against out-of-state taxpayers.  The dissent concluded that the statute effectively creates a tax on taxpayers with an out-of-state headquarters.

Although the majority ably walked through the existing case precedent on these issues, it misunderstood the practical effect of the statute.  First, the majority concluded that the statute did not discriminate against any particular market because all markets are treated the same.  This conclusion ignores the fact that under the statute, in-state markets are treated differently than out-of-state markets.  The majority stated that “[w]ithout any actual or prospective competition in a single market, there is no negative impact on interstate commerce that results from the application of this deduction and no discrimination against interstate commerce . . . .”  (Majority Opinion, p. 14).  However, there is competition between in-state companies and out-of-state companies, not just in a single market but in all markets.

In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997), which upheld the constitutionality of a tax that discriminated across markets (in other words, the statute benefited an in-state entity not because the entity was in-state but because it was in a different market and sold different products than an out-of-state entity).  The dissent specifically took exception to the majority’s reliance on Gen. Motors, for good reason.  The Tracy case does not appear to be applicable here, because the in-state and out-of-state entities are competing in the same markets under the Oklahoma statute.

Second, the majority concluded that the statute did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce because “[t]he degree to which the entity generating the gains participated in out-of-state activity, i.e. interstate commerce, is not relevant to whether the entity qualifies for the deduction”  (Majority Opinion, p. 17).  The [...]

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Illinois Trust Taxation Deemed Unconstitutional

In Linn v. Department of Revenue, the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court reviewed the state’s statutory framework for taxing trusts.  Linn v. Department of Revenue, 2013 Il App (4th) 121055.  On constitutional grounds, the court limited Illinois’ power to impose taxes under its “once subject to tax, forever subject to tax” regime.

This case creates planning opportunities to minimize Illinois income taxes.  However, it should be noted that the Linn case applies to trusts that pay Illinois income tax on trust dividends, interest, capital gains or other income retained by the trust and not distributed to a beneficiary.  This case does not apply to income distributed to an Illinois beneficiary; that income clearly can be taxed by Illinois.

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New York Issues First New Combined Reporting Law Determination—and It’s Not Pretty

Even though New York amended its combination statute for years beginning in 2007, we are just now beginning to see litigation related to those amendments.  At the end of June 2013, an administrative law judge in New York’s Division of Tax Appeals issued the first determination analyzing the new law.  The analysis in Matter of Knowledge Learning Corporation was notably quite restrictive, resulting in a taxpayer loss.

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N.Y. ALJ Holds Taxpayer’s Motives for Acquiring Stock and How Stock Is Used Irrelevant in Determining Investment Capital

A New York administrative law judge recently held in Matter of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. that income received by a taxpayer from its ownership of common stock was investment income.  In so holding, the ALJ addressed an important issue for many New York taxpayers and concluded that a taxpayer’s motive or intent for acquiring and holding stock and the manner in which the taxpayer used that stock are irrelevant to the determination of whether that stock qualifies as investment capital for corporate income tax purposes.

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