INSIDE SALT
INSIDE SALT
In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
INSIDE SALT
In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
Constitutional Issues
Subscribe to Constitutional Issues's Posts

U.S. Supreme Court’s Wynne Decision Calls New York’s Statutory Resident Scheme into Question

by and | May 21, 2015 | , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

On May 18, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne. In short, the Court, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Alito, handed the taxpayer a victory by holding that the county income tax portion of Maryland’s personal income tax scheme violated the dormant U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause.

Specifically, the Court concluded that the county income tax imposed under Maryland law failed the internal consistency test under the dormant Commerce Clause, because it is imposed on both residents and non-residents with Maryland residents not getting a credit against that Maryland local tax for income taxes paid to other jurisdictions (residents are given a credit against the Maryland state income tax for taxes paid to other jurisdictions).

The Supreme Court emphatically held (as emphatically as the Court can be in a five-to-four decision) that the dormant Commerce Clause’s internal consistency test applies to individual income taxes. The Court’s holding does create a perilous situation for any state or local income taxes that either do not provide a credit for taxes paid to other jurisdictions or limit the scope of such a credit in some way.

The internal consistency test—one of the methods used by the Supreme Court to examine whether a state tax imposition discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause—starts by assuming that every state has the same tax structure as the state with the tax at issue. If that hypothetical scenario places interstate commerce at a disadvantage compared to intrastate commerce by imposing a risk of multiple taxation, then the tax fails the internal consistency test and is unconstitutional.

Although the Wynne decision does not address the validity of other taxes beyond the Maryland county personal income tax, the decision does create significant doubt as to the validity of certain other state and local taxes such as the New York State personal income tax in the way it defines “resident.” New York State imposes its income tax on residents on all of their income and on non-residents on their income earned in the state; this is similar to the Maryland county income tax at issue in Wynne.

“Resident” is defined as either a domiciliary of New York or a person who is not a domiciliary of New York but has a permanent place of abode in New York and spends more than 183 days in New York during the tax year. N.Y. Tax Law § 605. (New York City has a comparable definition of resident.) N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 11-1705. Thus a person may be taxed as a statutory resident solely because they maintain living quarters in the state and spend more than 183 days in the state, even if those days have absolutely nothing to do with the living quarters; this category of non-domiciliary resident is commonly referred to a “statutory resident.” As such, under New York’s tax scheme, a person can be a resident of two states—where domiciled and where a statutory resident—and thus [...]

Continue Reading



read more

A Year’s Review of Massachusetts Tax Cases

by and | May 14, 2015 | , , , ,

Allied Domecq Spirits & Wines USA, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1125 (2014)

In a unique case, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed a ruling of the Appellate Tax Board (ATB) that two corporations could not be combined for corporation excise tax purposes for 1996 through 2004. The distinctive aspect of this case was that a company was found not to have nexus with Massachusetts even though it rented property in the state and had employees in the state. If the company had been found to have nexus, it could have applied its losses to offset the income of an affiliated Massachusetts taxpayer in a combined report. The Appeals Court pointed to factual findings of the ATB that the transfer of employees located in Massachusetts to the company “had no practical economic effect other than the creation of a tax benefit and that tax avoidance was its motivating factor and only purpose.” The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the taxpayer further review on August 1, 2014. Although this case is notable because the sham transaction doctrine rarely, if ever, has been applied to find that a company did not have nexus, a similar factual scenario likely would not occur today because Massachusetts adopted full unitary combination in 2009.

First Marblehead Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 470 Mass. 497, 23 N.E.3d 892 (2015)

In a case that attracted the attention of, and an amicus brief from, the Multistate Tax Commission, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed how the property factor of a taxpayer subject to the Financial Institution Excise Tax (FIET) should be apportioned. The taxpayer, Gate Holdings, Inc. (Gate), had its commercial domicile in Massachusetts and held interests in a number of Delaware statutory trusts that purchased student loan portfolios. Below, the ATB held that Gate’s loans should be assigned to Massachusetts, resulting in a 100-percent property factor for apportionment purposes. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and interpreted the Massachusetts sourcing provisions at issue, which are based on a model from the Multistate Tax Commission and incorporate the Solicitation, Investigation, Negotiation, Approval and Administration (SINAA) rules, as sourcing Gate’s loans to Massachusetts where Gates had its commercial domicile. The Supreme Judicial Court’s decision may be of interest in Massachusetts and other states because several states have adopted sourcing rules for financial institutions that are based on the Multistate Tax Commission’s model.

Genentech, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Mass. App. Tax Bd., Docket No. C282905, C293424, C298502, C298891 (2014)

The ATB held that Genentech, Inc., a biotechnology company, was engaged in substantial manufacturing and thus required to use single sales factor apportionment. Genentech is appealing the ruling.

National Grid Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Mass. App. Tax Bd., Docket No.  C292287; C292288; C292289 (2014); National Grid USA Service v. Comm’r of Revenue, Mass. App. Tax Bd., Docket No. C314926 (2014)

The ATB addressed whether an international utility corporation’s deferred subscription arrangements constituted debt for corporate excise purposes. The ATB held that it did not. In reaching its decision, [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Decoding Combination: What Is a Unitary Business

by | Apr 14, 2015 | , , , , , ,

This article is the first of our new series regarding common issues and opportunities associated with combined reporting. Because most states either statutorily require or permit some method of combined reporting, it is important for taxpayers to understand the intricacies of and opportunities in combined reporting statutes and regulations.

In this article, we will explore the foundation for combined reporting – the unitary business principle.

Read the full article.



read more

Delaware’s Unclaimed Property Audit Program Dealt Blow

by , and | Mar 13, 2015 | , ,

The judge in a case challenging Delaware’s use of sampling and extrapolation to determine unclaimed property liability denied the state’s motion to dismiss and in doing so, seriously questioned the State’s approach.  Temple-Inland v. Cook, U.S. Dist. Ct. (DE), Civ. No. 14-654-SLR (3/11/2015).  Temple-Inland brought a suit against the State following an unclaimed property audit of its accounts payable balances and before the audit of other property types was completed.  Delaware found Temple-Inland liable for unclaimed property going back to 1986 based on the use of sampling and extrapolation.  On March 11, 2015, Judge Robinson ruled on the Temple-Inland’s summary judgment motion and the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  While the State won one issue, Temple-Inland certainly came out ahead overall.

Let’s start with the bad news first: the one dark spot in the opinion for holders is that the judge decided that the U.S. Supreme Court’s priority rule cases (Texas v. Delaware and its progeny) only applied to disputes over custody between states, not between a private holder and a state.  This decision seems to conflict with a precedential Third Circuit case, Retail Merchants Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 375 (3rd Cir. 2012).  The judge also did not seem to take to heart the role of the U.S. Supreme Court.  The judge oddly stated that “finding that the Supreme Court’s holding in Delaware preempts the State’s valid exercise of regulatory power . . . would be contrary to the well-established principle that federal courts may not ordinarily displace state law.”  That is exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court is supposed to do (in fact, last week the Court ruled federal courts have just such authority in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl).

With the bad news out of the way, the good news is that not only does the judge agree to move forward with all of Temple-Inland’s other claims, but expresses significant doubt as to the validity of the State’s position regarding the authority to use estimation prior to a 2010 statutory change.  The judge appears to be ready to move forward on hearing factual support for the following claims asserted by the plaintiff:  substantive due process, Ex Post Facto Clause, Takings Clause, Commerce Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause.

The really good news for holders is that the judge seems to have backed the State into a corner.  In analyzing the due process and ex post facto claims, the judge noted that “[the] defendants are faced with a dilemma:  “If §1155 [the 2010 provision authorizing estimation] is not a penalty provision, it likely violates plaintiff’s rights to substantive due process.  If, on the other hand, § 1155 is a penalty provision, its retroactive application likely violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The court is unprepared, at this juncture to determine which scenario is most likely.”  With this opinion, Delaware may finally be feeling the walls closing in and a giant alien cephalopod reaching up [...]

Continue Reading



read more

SCOTUS: Colorado Notice and Reporting Challenge Not Barred by the Tax Injunction Act

by , and | Mar 3, 2015 | , , , , ,

The United States Supreme Court released a unanimous decision today holding that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1391, does not bar suit in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of Colorado notice and reporting requirements imposed on noncollecting out-of-state retailers. See Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, No. 13-1032, 575 U.S. ___ (March 3, 2015), available here. These requirements, enacted in 2010, require retailers to (1) notify Colorado purchasers that tax is due on their purchases; (2) send annual notices to Colorado customers who purchased more than $500 in goods in the preceding year, “reminding” these purchasers of their obligation to pay sales tax to the state; and (3) report information on Colorado purchasers to the state’s tax authorities. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5). The TIA provides that federal district courts “shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law.”

The Court’s Opinion

The Court held that although the notice and reporting requirements are part of Colorado’s overall assessment and collection process, none of the requirements constitute an “assessment,” “levy,” or “collection” within the meaning of the TIA. Specifically, the Court looked to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to determine that the terms are “discrete phrases of the taxation process that do not include informational notice or private reports of information relevant to tax liability.” See Slip Op. at 5-8 (noting that no “assessment” or “collection” within the meaning of the IRC occurs until there is a recording of the amount the taxpayer owes the Government, which the notice and reporting requirements precede).  Justice Thomas, who authored the opinion, concluded that “[t]he TIA is keyed to the acts of assessment, levy, and collection themselves, and enforcement of the notice and reporting requirements is none of these.” Id. at 9.

The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on (and expansive interpretation of) the term “restrain” in the TIA.  Justice Thomas explained that such a broad reading of the statute would “defeat the precision” of the specifically enumerated terms and allow courts to expand the TIA beyond its statutory meaning to “virtually any court action related to any phase of taxation.” Id. at 11.  Instead, he assigned the same meaning to “restrain” that it has in equity for TIA purposes, which is consistent with its roots and the Anti-Injunction Act (the TIA’s federal counterpart).  Therefore, the Court concluded that “a suit cannot be understood to ‘restrain’ the ‘assessment, levy or collection’ of a state tax if it merely inhibits those activities.” Id. at 12.

The Court’s decision took “no position on whether a suit such as this one might nevertheless be barred under the ‘comity doctrine,’” under which federal courts – as a matter of discretion, not jurisdiction – refrain from “interfering with the fiscal operations of the state governments in all cases where the Federal rights of persons could otherwise be preserved unimpaired.” Id. at 13. The Court left it to the Tenth Circuit on remand [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Arizona’s 2015 TPT Amendments Have 99 Problems, but Origin Sourcing ain’t One

by , and | Jan 29, 2015 | , , , ,

Actually, there are really only two issues, but they are big issues.

Arizona’s Transaction Privilege Tax has always been an anomaly in the traditional state sales tax system.  Contrary to some commentators, however, the recent amendments do not, and could not, impose an origin tax on Arizona retailers for remote sales delivered out-of-state.  That is not to say that these amendments are benign.  Oddly, the amendments provide incentives for Arizona residents shipping items out-of-state to purchase these items over the internet rather than visit Arizona retailers in person.  Furthermore, these amendments create complexities for Arizona vendors shipping to foreign jurisdictions.   Finally, these amendments create additional administrative problems for retailers that are difficult to address with existing software and invite double taxation problems that should not exist in a transaction tax world.

Background: Arizona Transaction Privilege and Use Tax

For retail sales, Arizona, like most states, has two complementary transaction-based taxes, but each tax is imposed on a different entity.  The first tax, the Transaction Privilege Tax (TPT), is imposed directly on the retailer.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-5001.13.  A retailer will be subject to the TPT on the gross proceeds from a sale if “the location where the sale is made” is Arizona.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-5034.A.9.  A retailer subject to the TPT is allowed but not required to collect the amount of TPT it owes from its customers.  Ariz. Admin. Code §§ 15-5-2002, 15-5-2210.

The second tax, the Arizona Use Tax, complements and backstops the TPT.  The Use Tax is imposed on the use, storage or consumption in the State of tangible personal property purchased from an out-of-state retailer.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-5155.  Generally, the purchaser is liable for payment of Use Tax to the State, but a retailer is required to collect Use Tax from a purchaser if the retailer meets the constitutional nexus provisions.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-5155, 42-5160.  Use Tax is imposed only on transactions where TPT has not been imposed, i.e., a transaction is subject to either TPT or Use Tax, but not both.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-5159.A.1.

The State and its courts have been clear that, while the location of the transfer of title or possession is relevant to the inquiry as to where the sale is made, it is the totality of the retailer’s business activities that identifies the location that may tax the proceeds.  Exactly where that line is drawn, however, is not as clear.  The Arizona Department of Revenue (DOR) has taken the position that, unless an exemption applies, a seller is subject to the tax if a purchaser buys a product at a store, even if the purchaser does not take possession in the state, and the product is shipped to a location outside of the state.  The DOR is apparently taking the position either that the title transfers in the store, which cannot always be the case (a retailer could easily specify that title transfers to the customer outside the store, particularly if the retailer [...]

Continue Reading



read more

The New “Click-Through”?: New York Budget Proposal Requires Marketplace Providers to Collect Tax

by and | Jan 22, 2015 | , , , , ,

On January 21, Governor Cuomo delivered his State of the State address, along with proposing the new budget. The budget has a number of new tax proposals. One of those proposals would have a significant impact on e-commerce companies. Part X of the budget proposal amends the sales tax statutes to require marketplace providers to collect and remit sales tax on sales to New York customers. A marketplace provider is a person who, pursuant to an agreement with a seller, “facilitates a sale, occupancy, or admission” by the seller. A person can be a marketplace provider if they facilitate the sale, or are an affiliate of a person facilitating the sale. For purposes of this definition, affiliate companies are companies that have common ownership of 5 percent.

“Facilitates a sale, occupancy, or admission” means:

(1) such person, or an affiliated person, collects the receipts, rent or amusement charge paid by a customer, occupant or patron to a marketplace seller; and

(2) such person performs either of the following activities:

(A) provides the forum in which, or by means of which, the sale takes place or the offer of occupancy or admission is accepted, including a shop, store or booth, or an internet website, catalog or a similar forum; or

(B) arranges for the exchange of information or messages between the customer, occupant or patron, as the case may be, and the marketplace seller.

A marketplace provider meeting these requirements would be required to collect as if the marketplace provider were the vendor.

Under current law, a seller is required to collect and remit tax on sales made to New York customers. Under the budget proposal, a seller would no longer be required to collect if the marketplace provider provides a collection certificate to the seller. (The Division of Taxation is required to develop procedures to administer the certificate). If a marketplace provider does not provide a collection certificate, but does use language approved by the Division of Taxation and Finance in a publicly-available agreement, that will have the same effect as the provision of a collection certificate.

The imposition under the proposal is directly on the marketplace provider. There does not appear to currently be any provision that would allow a seller in a marketplace to collect instead of the marketplace provider, if the seller so desired.

Marketplace providers are relieved of liability if the information provided to them by the seller is incorrect. However, there is no provision in the bill requiring the marketplace sellers to provide any information to the marketplace provider.

The law does not change existing nexus or ‘doing business’ requirements. It appears that a marketplace provider would be required to collect only if the marketplace provider has nexus with New York under the Commerce Clause.

This proposal would have a significant effect on e-commerce companies, and could have an impact reminiscent of the impact of the click-through statutes. Companies that sell through a [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Texas Comptroller Defies the Laws of Physics

by | Dec 22, 2014 | , , ,

In this article, the authors examine a recent Texas administrative law judge’s opinion that says an out-of state company has nexus with Texas through downloaded software that it licenses to Texas customers.  They argue that the state comptroller’s adoption of the decision allows sales and use tax liability to be based on economic nexus instead of physical nexus and is therefore unconstitutional.

Read the full article.



read more

Lame-Duck Congress Mulls Laws to Ease State Tax Headaches

by | Dec 8, 2014 | , , , , ,

As it heads into the final weeks of its session, Congress is considering various bills that would restrict or expand states’ taxing authority. Almost every business in the country would be affected by at least some of these bills.  While some of these bills have progressed further than others, any could become law—particularly if bundled into legislation that Congress must, as a practical and political matter, pass before the session ends. Businesses thus have an opportunity to ask their Senators and Representatives to take action to rein in some of the problems with state and local taxes.

Read the full article on CFO.com.



read more

New York ALJ Rejects Retroactive Application of Statute

by | Sep 8, 2014 | , , ,

State courts generally have allowed legislatures a fair amount of flexibility in adopting retroactive statutes, but a recent New York case held that, under the circumstances presented, the retroactive application of a statute was unconstitutional.   In Matter of Jeffrey and Melissa Luizza (DTA No. 824932) (Aug. 21, 2014), Mr. Luizza agreed to sell all of the stock of an S corporation to an unrelated buyer in a transaction governed by Section 338(h)(10) of the Internal Revenue Code.  Under Section 338(h)(10), Mr. Luizza’s sale of his stock was ignored for income tax purposes and the transaction was treated as if the corporation had sold its assets and distributed the proceeds to Mr. Luizza.  Under the Subchapter S rules, the liquidation was essentially tax-free.  The corporation’s gain was passed through to Mr. Luizza as the sole shareholder.  Mr. Luizza was a nonresident of New York and under the law in effect when the sale occurred (March 2008) it appeared that a nonresident shareholder was not taxed on the gain in a 338(h)(10) sale because the transaction was treated as a sale of stock.

In 2009, the State Tax Appeals Tribunal confirmed that although a 338(h)(10) transaction was treated as a sale of assets by the corporation for federal income tax purposes, it was in fact a sale of stock and, since nonresidents are not subject to New York State income tax on gains from the sale of stock, even of a corporation doing business in New York, a nonresident selling stock of an S corporation in a 338(h)(10) transaction cannot be taxed by New York State on the resulting gain.  In Matter of Gabriel S. and Frances B. Baum, et al., (DTA Nos. 820837, 820838) (Feb. 12. 2009) (McDermott Will & Emery filed an amicus brief supporting the taxpayer’s position in that case.)

The State Department of Taxation and Finance was not happy about the result of this litigation.  It convinced the legislature to reverse that result by amending the statute to provide that a shareholder’s share of the corporation’s gain in a 338(h)(10) transaction would be treated as New York source income that was taxable to nonresidents.  The legislation was adopted in 2010 and was made effective retroactively to all years open under the statute of limitations.

Mr. Luizza objected to the retroactive application of the statute to him, and the administrative law judge agreed that, on his facts, the retroactivity was so harsh as to be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  The ALJ pointed out that the taxpayer relied on the law as it existed in 2008 and that at the time of the sale the prevailing authority was that the transaction was not taxable.  Mr. Luizza was advised by his tax advisors that there would be no additional New York tax due.  Because of his reliance, he did not have an opportunity to seek a higher sale price or to require the buyer to indemnify him for any additional taxes resulting from [...]

Continue Reading



read more

BLOG EDITORS

Stephen P. Kranz

Mary Kay McCalla Martire

Richard C. Call

STAY CONNECTED

Subscribe

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

jd supra readers choice top firm 2023 badge