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INSIDE SALT
In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
INSIDE SALT
In-Depth Coverage of Issues Surrounding State and Local Tax
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Viral Marketers Beware – In Alabama, Sales Tax Nexus Created for Out-of-State Bookseller Even Though In-State Teachers Not Acting on Behalf of Seller

by and | Mar 31, 2016 | , , , , , ,

After a quarter of a century, the school book nexus cases continue to proliferate, delight and mystify.  The latest installment in the saga is from Alabama.  Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. 2931 v. State Of Alabama Department Of Revenue, Ala. Tax Tribunal, Dkt. No. S. 14-374 (March 25, 2016).  Like the other cases, the question addressed is whether a vendor with no property or employees in the state nevertheless has nexus for sales tax collection purposes because of the activities of unrelated, and uncompensated, teachers in the state.  Like all of the other cases, these teachers received unsolicited catalogs from the vendor and could either discard the materials or distribute them to their students.  Like all of the other cases, if a teacher elected to distribute the materials, the teacher collected completed order forms and payments from the students and mailed the order and payments to the vendor.   Like all of the other cases, the teacher distributed the order once received to the individual students that placed orders.  Also, like all of the other cases the vendor provided bonus points to teachers based on the dollar amount ordered.  The vendor intended the bonus points be used to purchase additional classroom materials – either from the vendor directly or through gift cards to another retailer.

In reaching its decision, the Alabama Tax Tribunal (the Court) restricted its analysis to the historical Quill physical presence standard.  While noting that on the same facts courts in other states have been severely split on the issue of whether physical presence existed for such a vendor, the Court determined that the opinions finding physical presence were more persuasive.  The Court quoted at length from Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 38 A.3d 1183 (Conn. 2012).

As with most of the other bookseller cases in which a court found substantial nexus existed, the Alabama Tax Tribunal focused on the Scripto language negating the importance of labels such as “agent,” “independent contractor,” and “representative.”  This is a red-herring, as the correct analysis should be that regardless of the label, on whose behalf were the teachers acting.  Evidence was introduced that the teachers were acting on behalf of their students, not the vendor.  The Court, however, assumed this bedrock issue away by finding that regardless of on whose behalf the teachers were acting, because the teachers’ activities were substantially associated with Scholastic’s ability to establish and maintain a market in the state, this result was sufficient to establish physical presence for the vendor.  According to the Court, it did not matter that the teachers did not receive any type of compensation from the vendor and did not intend to benefit the vendor.  The only thing that mattered to the nexus analysis was that at the end of the day, the teachers were important to Scholastic’s maintenance of a market in the state.

But that cannot be the correct analysis.  Otherwise, any advertising campaign that relied on word-of-mouth (and similarly any viral marketing campaign) would establish nexus [...]

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A Steep Slope — Vermont Supreme Court Finds AIG Not Unitary With a Ski Resort Based On a Clear and Cogent Evidence Burden of Proof

by and | Nov 30, 2015 | , , , , , ,

In the first Vermont Supreme Court decision addressing combined unitary reporting since Vermont’s combined reporting regime became effective in 2006, the court affirmed a lower court’s decision that AIG, the multinational insurance company, was not unitary with a ski resort operated by a subsidiary in Vermont; accordingly, a combined report covering the two businesses was not required. The decision is important because it lays the foundation for future unitary cases in Vermont.

The court agreed with AIG that there were no economies of scale between the operations of AIG and the ski resort. “Because [the entity] is a ski resort and therefore its business type is not similar to AIG’s insurance and financial service business, there is no opportunity for common centralized distribution or sales, and no economy of scale realized by their operations.” On centralization of management, the court noted that although AIG controlled the appointments to the ski resort’s board and management, this did not translate into “actual control” over the ski resort’s operations. Lastly, the Vermont Department of Taxes attempted to argue functional integration based primarily on AIG’s influx of working capital to the ski resort. The court rejected this assertion stating the funding “served an investment rather than operational function. The financing was not part of an AIG operational goal to grow part of its business. Further, there is no operational integration between AIG’s insurance and financial businesses and the ski resort operated by [the resort].”

The case is interesting because it involved whether an instate entity was unitary with its parent. For the year at issue, Vermont had a three factor apportionment formula with a double-weighted sales factor. Presumably, the ski resort had a high Vermont apportionment factor and relatively little income, so including AIG in the combined group increased AIG’s Vermont apportionment factor without significantly  diluting its income.

Interestingly, the court addressed AIG’s burden of proof on the unitary issue. The taxpayer argued that a preponderance of the evidence standard should apply. The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed. Looking to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Container Corp. as well as to decisions of other states, the taxpayer has the burden of proving by “clear and cogent” evidence that its operations are not unitary.  Interestingly, the court suggested that one California court decision that applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to a unitary question was distinguishable because that case involved a taxpayer claiming that unity existed — and AIG was claiming that unity did not exist. This disparate burden depending on the direction of the unitary argument may prove important to taxpayers seeking to bring entities or operations into a combined report in Vermont.

State tax professionals may react to this decision in a manner similar to the way many reacted when the Court of Appeals of Arizona decided Talley Industries and Woolworth. Those decisions engendered substantial hope that courts — and, ultimately, state revenue agencies — would analyze unitariness not on the basis of a “checklist” or as a knee-jerk reaction to [...]

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Illinois Appellate Court Holds City of Chicago Tax on Cars Rented Outside of but Used Within the City Valid

by | Oct 2, 2015 | , , , , , ,

An Illinois Appellate Court, in Hertz Corp. v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 123210 (Sept. 22, 2015), gave the City of Chicago (City) permission to require rental car companies to collect tax on vehicle rentals from locations within three miles of the City, overturning a lower court ruling that found such taxation was an extraterritorial exercise of the City’s authority.  The appellate court granted summary judgment to the City and lifted the permanent injunction enjoining the City from enforcing the tax.

The tax at issue is the City’s Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax (Lease Tax), which is imposed upon “(1) the lease or rental in the city of personal property, or (2) the privilege of using in the city personal property that is leased or rented outside of the city.”  Mun. Code of Chi. § 3-32-030(A).  While the Lease Tax is imposed upon and must be paid by the lessee, the lessor is obligated to collect it at the time the lessee makes a lease payment and remit it to the City.  Mun. Code of Chi. §§ 3-32-030(A), 3-32-070(A).

The subject of this litigation is the City’s application of the Tax in its Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Second Amended Ruling No. 11 (eff. May 1, 2011) (Ruling 11).  The plaintiffs argued that Ruling 11 is an extraterritorial exercise of the City’s authority because the City lacks nexus with the rental transactions.  The Ruling “concerns [short-term] vehicle rentals to Chicago residents, on or after July 1, 2011, from suburban locations within 3 miles of Chicago’s border … [excluding locations within O’Hare International Airport] by motor vehicle rental companies doing business in the City.”  Ruling 11 § 1.  The Ruling explains that “‘doing business’ in the City includes, for example, having a location in the City or regularly renting vehicles that are used in the City, such that the company is subject to audit by the [City of Chicago Department of Finance] under state and federal law.”  Ruling 11 § 3.  As for taxability of leased property, the Ruling cites the primary use exemption, exempting from Tax “[t]he use in the city of personal property leased or rented outside the city if the property is primarily used (more than 50 percent) outside the city” and stating the taxpayer or tax collector has the burden of proving where the use occurs.  Ruling 11 § 2(c) (quoting Mun. Code of Chi. § 3-32-050(A)(1)).

Ruling 11 contains a rebuttable presumption that motor vehicles rented to customers who are Chicago residents from the suburban locations of rental companies that are otherwise doing business in Chicago are subject to the Lease Tax.  The Ruling applies to companies with suburban addresses located within three miles of the City.   The presumption may be rebutted by any writing disputing the conclusion that the vehicle is is used more than 50 percent of the time in the City.  The opposite is assumed for non-Chicago residents.  Ruling 11 § 3.  The [...]

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Taking a Stand Against Retroactive State Legislation

by | Sep 9, 2015 | ,

Changing the past: Serious scientists, talented fantasists, regretful Ashley Madison members and many other segments of humanity have considered, and even longed for, the ability to rewrite history. One group has apparently succeeded – state legislatures that backdate tax law changes.

Such success may be short lived, however, as experts identify significant legal and policy faults with retroactively changing tax obligations.  Two recent articles in State Tax Today explain why retroactive tax laws should not be passed and if they are, should be invalidated by the courts – and invalidated retroactively. In “Retroactive Tax Laws Are Just Wrong” David Brunori (Deputy Publisher, State Tax Today) describes the fairness problem with retroactive tax legislation.  In a second article, the monthly interview column “Raising the Bar,” McDermott’s Steve Kranz and Diann L. Smith, Joe Crosby (MultiState Associates) and Kendall Houghton (Alston & Bird LLP) provide details on recent cases addressing retroactive tax changes.

The Council On State Taxation (COST) is also offering a discussion of this issue at its 46th Annual Meeting/Fall Audit Session in Chicago, Illinois (October 20-23, 2015).   McDermott’s Diann L. Smith, Catie Oryl (COST) and Scott Brandman (Baker & McKenzie) will discuss “Retroactive Legislation: Just a ‘Clarification’?”  If you are interested in receiving a copy of the COST outline following the event, please contact Diann at dlsmith@mwe.com.



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Post-DMA, Federal Court of Appeals Broadly Interprets Jurisdictional Limitations of Anti-Injunction Act

by , and | Sep 3, 2015 | , , ,

Earlier this month, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held in Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 14-5036 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 2015) that the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)) barred two state banking associations from challenging Treasury regulations that: (1) required banks to annually report interest paid to certain foreign account-holders, and (2) imposed a penalty on banks that fail to do so.  Notwithstanding attempts to reconcile the holding with recent precedent, the majority’s decision directly conflicts with the recent unanimous Supreme Court decision in Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (March 3, 2015) (DMA), which found that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341) did not bar a retail association’s challenge to comparable Colorado notice and reporting requirements (and accompanying penalty) imposed on out-of-state retailers.  The TIA is modeled off of, and has consistently been interpreted to apply in the same fashion as its federal companion, the AIA. Given the striking similarities between the two cases, it is hard to reconcile the expansive application of the AIA in Florida Bankers with the narrow analysis of the TIA in DMA.

Majority Opinion

The majority opinion begins by highlighting the fact that the penalty imposed on the banks is technically a “tax” for purposes of the AIA because it is found in a specific section of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC, Ch. 68, Subchapter B) that states as much. See 26 U.S.C. § 6671(a). The majority emphasized that the Supreme Court recently confirmed that these types of penalties are treated as taxes when analyzing the application of the AIA, citing to the Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius decision. The majority distinguishes DMA on the basis that, unlike the tax-penalty in Chapter 68B of the IRC, the Colorado penalty imposed on out of state retailers that failed to report was not—or at least the parties never argued or suggested that it was—itself a tax. The majority was clear that “[i]f the penalty here were not itself a tax, the Anti-Injunction Act would not bar this suit.” Because the penalty was a “tax”, a favorable ruling for the plaintiffs “would invalidate the reporting requirement and restrain (indeed eliminate) the assessment and collection of the tax paid for not complying with the reporting requirement.”  Because of this, the majority held that the banking associations’ challenge to the reporting requirements was barred by the AIA.

Practice Note: The majority relies heavily on the technical tax-penalty distinction in reaching their holding that the AIA applied. In making this distinction, the majority suggests that the label given to a penalty is controlling in determining whether the AIA and TIA apply to shut the door to federal district court. While at first glance it would appear that the holding is limited in scope to federal tax issues, it has the potential to spill over into the state tax world since many states have specifically conformed to [...]

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Straight Outta Delaware: JLI Invest S.A. et al. v. Cook et al.

by , and | Aug 25, 2015 | , , , ,

As soon as we start to think that Delaware’s unclaimed property practices and administration couldn’t possibly get any more egregious, another lawsuit like JLI Invest S.A. et al. v. Cook et al., Case No. 11274 surfaces. The facts alleged in the complaint highlight the fundamental issue of just how much “protection” state unclaimed property laws provide to owners. In this case, Delaware apparently protected two scientists out of $12,024,148.25. Yay Delaware. The scientists are not happy (we would be crying on the floor with either (a) a vat of Graeter’s ice cream or (b) a barrel of Sancerre) and have sued Delaware for their lost value.

Facts

Dr. Gilles Gosselin and Dr. Jean Louis Imbach are the two Belgian scientists who headed the research team responsible for creating a Hepatitis B drug. Idenix Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was established to commercially develop this drug. As the creators of the drug, Dr. Gosselin and Dr. Imbach were given an ownership interest amounting to approximately 10 percent of the Idenix shares. These shares were held by JLI Invest S.A. and LIN Invest S.A. (the plaintiffs), two Belgian companies established for this purpose.

Despite the facts that (a) both Idenix and Computershare (their transfer agent) had record of the mailing address of each plaintiff and no mail was ever returned undeliverable—as required by Delaware law at the time for property to be deemed abandoned— and (b) that scientists both continued to perform professional services for Idenix, Computershare reported the Idenix shares to Delaware in November 2008 and delivered all of the shares to Delaware on January 2, 2009.  Three days later, Delaware sold the shares for a total of $1,695,851.75 (approximately $3.03 per share). At the time, Idenix had approximately 50 shareholders, and the market for the shares was illiquid.

After making an inquiry concerning the stock to Computershare three years later in 2012, the plaintiffs learned that their shares had been escheated to Delaware. Upon contacting the Delaware Office of Unclaimed Property to claim their property, the plaintiffs were forced to provide substantial documentation verifying their status as the rightful owner, which they did in October and December 2012. After over a year of “pending” status, the plaintiffs were directed to complete a “Request Form” in May 2013, at which time it was noted that a response could take another 12 weeks.

On June 9, 2014, Merck and Idenix announced that Merck would acquire Idenix via a cash tender offer for $24.50 per share. Because the plaintiffs’ shares had been escheated to (and immediately sold by) Delaware in 2009, they were not able to participate in the tender offer despite their desire to. Had they been able to participate, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to receive a total of $13,720,000 for their shares. Meanwhile, Delaware had still not responded regarding the status of their claim. Notably, it was not until October 2014 (over two years after their initial request) that the Delaware Office of Unclaimed Property confirmed that the plaintiffs Idenix shares were [...]

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How Far Back Can a Back Tax Go? Petition for Certiorari in Hambleton Asks Supreme Court to Right Unjust Retroactivity

by | Jul 14, 2015 | ,

Retroactivity is an endemic problem in the state tax world.  In this year alone, we have seen retroactive repeal of the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) in Michigan, as well as significant retroactivity issues in New York, New Jersey and Virginia.  But after decades of states changing the rules on taxpayers after-the-fact, relief may be on the way if the Supreme Court of the United States grants certiorari in a Washington estate tax case, Hambleton v. Washington, with retroactivity that makes you say “What the heck?”.

The taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari on June 5, 2015.  The Court requested a response, which is now due by September 9, 2015.  The Tax Executives Institute filed an amicus brief on July 6, 2015.

The case involves two widows’ estates.  As stated in the petition:

Helen Hambleton died in 2006, and Jessie Macbride died in 2007.  Each was the passive lifetime beneficiary of a trust established in her deceased husband’s estate, and neither possessed a power under the trust instrument to dispose of the trust assets.  Under the Washington estate tax law at the time of their deaths, the tax did not apply to the value of those trust assets.  In 2013, however, the Washington Legislature amended the estate tax statutes retroactively back to 2005, exposing their estates to nearly two million dollars of back taxes.

In 2005, Washington state enacted an estate tax that was intended to operate on a standalone basis, separate from the federal estate tax.  In interpreting the new law, the Department of Revenue issued regulations that the transfer of property from the petitioners’ husbands to the petitioners through a Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) trust was not subject to the Washington estate tax.  The Department then reversed its position and assessed tax.  Petitioners, along with other estates, challenged the Department’s position and won in Washington Supreme Court (In re Estate of Bracken, 290 P.3d 99 (Wash. 2012)).  Then in 2013, the Washington legislature amended the estate tax to retroactively adopt the Department’s position, going back to 2005.  The petitioners challenged this law up to the Washington Supreme Court, which held in favor of the Department and concluded that the retroactive change satisfied the due process clause under a rational basis standard.

The petition urges the Supreme Court to take the case to resolve the uncertainty as to “how long is too long” when it comes to retroactive taxes, citing multiple examples of past and ongoing litigation in which lower courts have taken divergent approaches to the length of retroactivity that is permissible.  Of particular interest, one of the cases cited is International Business Machines Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 852 N.W.2d 865 (Mich. 2014).  The retroactive repeal of the MTC election in Michigan is a central issue in that ongoing litigation. If the Supreme Court takes Hambleton, its decision would likely impact the Michigan MTC litigation. The recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals, allowing [...]

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California’s Harley-Davidson Decision Rides over Nexus Lines

by | Jul 13, 2015 | , , , ,

On May 28 2015, The California Court of Appeals issued a decision in Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672; and it was ultimately about much more than the validity of an election within California’s combined-reporting regime. It also tackled issues and, perhaps most importantly, blurred lines surrounding the Commerce Clause’s substantial nexus requirement. In Harley-Davidson, the court concluded that two corporations with no California physical presence had substantial nexus with California due to non-sales-related activities conducted by an in-state agent. The court applied an “integral and crucial” standard for purposes of determining whether the activities conducted by an in-state agent satisfy Commerce Clause nexus requirements.

The corporations at issue were established as bankruptcy-remote special purpose entities (SPEs) and were engaged in securing loans for their parent and affiliated corporations that conducted business in California. As a preliminary matter, the court found that an entity with a California presence was an agent of the SPEs. The court then concluded that the activities conducted by the in-state agent created California nexus for the SPEs that satisfied both Due Process and Commerce Clause requirements.

The Due Process Clause requires some “minimum connection” between the state and the person it seeks to tax, and is concerned with the fairness of the governmental activity. Accordingly, a Due Process Clause analysis focuses on “notice” and “fair warning,” and the Due Process nexus requirement will be satisfied if an out-of-state company has purposefully directed its activities at the taxing state. In Harley-Davidson, the SPEs purpose was to generate liquidity for the in-state entity in a cost-effective manner so that it could make loans to Harley-Davidson dealers, including dealers in California. Additionally, the SPEs’ loan pools contained more loans from California than from any other state, and the in-state entity oversaw collection activities, including repossessions and sales of motorcycles, at California locations on behalf of the SPEs. As a result, the court concluded that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” were satisfied.

The Commerce Clause requires a “substantial nexus” between the person being taxed and the state. The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed this substantial nexus requirement, holding that a seller must have a physical presence in the taxing state to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement for sales-and-use tax purposes. In Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington State Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that, “the crucial factor governing [Commerce Clause] nexus is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the sales.” While Harley-Davidson argued that the activities of the in-state agent could not create nexus for the SPEs, as such activities were not sales-related activities, the California court rejected this argument stating that “this argument fails from the outset, however, because the third-party’s in state conduct need not be sales-related; it need only be an integral and crucial aspect of the businesses” (internal [...]

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House Judiciary Committee Approves Three State Tax Bills

by , , and | Jun 18, 2015 | , , , , , ,

Yesterday, on June 17, 2015, three state tax bills were favorably reported to the United States House of Representatives (House) by the House Judiciary Committee (House Judiciary) after considering each during a half-day markup. The bills that were advanced included: (1) the Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act (Mobile Workforce, H.R. 2315); (2) the Digital Goods and Services Tax Fairness Act (DGSTFA, H.R. 1643); and (3) the Business Activity Tax Simplification Act (BATSA, H.R. 2584).

Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act

The Mobile Workforce bill was the first considered and seeks to establish a clear, uniform framework for when states may tax non-resident employees that travel for work. As advanced, the bill generally allows states to impose income tax compliance burdens on non-resident individuals only when the non-resident works in a state other than their state of residence for more than 30 days in a year. The bill also prevents those states from imposing a withholding requirement on employers for wages paid to such employees. Three proposed amendments seeking to limit the adverse revenue impact to New York were discussed and rejected. The Mobile Workforce bill was then favorably reported to the House by a vote of 23-4.

Digital Goods and Services Tax Fairness Act

DGSTFA would implement a uniform sourcing framework for states and localities seeking to tax digital goods and services. In doing so, the bill prevents any state or locality from imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes. Of the three pieces of legislation considered yesterday, only the DGSTFA was amended. The amendment, offered by the bill’s lead sponsor Representative Lamar Smith, was technical in nature and did not change the basic protections the bill would provide. At the markup, Chairman Goodlatte noted that the National Governors Association (NGA), which had previously voiced objections, was no longer opposed to the legislation after the revisions—though the NGA testimony indicated that the organization could not support the legislation without addressing the remote seller sales tax nexus issue.

The first technical changes in the adopted amendment were to the definitions of delivered or transferred electronically and provided electronically. The amendment added the term digital good and digital service after each respective term of art to clarify that digital goods are delivered or transferred electronically, whereas digital services are provided electronically. The second technical change was to the definition of digital good. In modifying the term, the amendment clarifies that streaming and other similar digital transmissions that do not “result in the delivery to the customer of a complete copy of such software or other good, with the right to use permanently or for a specified period” are not digital goods and would instead fall under the definition of a digital service.

Business Activity Tax Simplification Act

BATSA would codify the prerequisite of physical presence for a state to impose a direct tax on a non-resident business. BATSA would modernize the existing federal protection against state income taxation offered under P.L. 86-272 to include solicitation for sales of intangible property and services [...]

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Remote Transactions Parity Act Introduced in the U.S. House

by , and | Jun 15, 2015 | , , , , ,

Today, Representative Jason Chaffetz introduced H.R. 2775, the Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015 (RTPA), in the United States House of Representatives (House).

The RTPA addresses the Internet sales tax issue using the structure of the Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA), which passed the Senate in 2013 and was re-introduced earlier this year. Although the RTPA retains many of the features of the MFA, it adds protections for remote sellers and certified software providers.

MFA Authorization Framework Retained

Like the MFA, the RTPA creates two paths for states to impose sales and use taxes on remote sellers. Through the first path, states that are members of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) are authorized to impose sales and use tax collection requirements on remote sellers. Under the second path, a state that is not a member state under the SSTUA would also be authorized to collect and remit sales and use taxes on remote transactions if it implements certain simplification requirements and protections for remote sellers and certified software providers. Many of these are carried over from the MFA, notably: (1) destination sourcing for interstate transactions; (2) a single entity for administration of sales and use tax; (3) a single audit of remote sellers per state; (4) a single return per state; (5) uniform tax base for all state and local sales taxes within the state; and (6) relief for errors, including remote sellers being relieved of errors made by a certified software provider or the state itself, and certified software providers being relieved of errors made by a remote seller or the state itself. Like the MFA, the RTPA would be effective one year from enactment, but not during the period from October through December in the year following enactment.

Changes

The RTPA contains several notable differences from the MFA, discussed below.

Small Seller Exception

Under the MFA, there is a fixed exception for small sellers and states are not authorized to impose a sales and use tax on small sellers, defined as remote sellers making sales of $1 million or less.

Under the RTPA, the small seller exception starts off larger, and subsequently phased out. In the first year, the exception applies for sellers making sales of $10 million or less. In the second and third year, the threshold is $5 million and $1 million, respectively. The exception goes away in the fourth year. Furthermore, under the RTPA sellers utilizing an electronic marketplace are not considered small sellers and are not entitled to the exception, no matter the year.

Protections to Sellers and Certified Software Providers

The RTPA provides additional protections for remote sellers and certified software providers.  The RTPA contains a mechanism to make sure that a state is not authorized to impose a sales and use tax collection requirement on remote sellers until it has certified multiple software providers, and those providers are certified in all other states seeking to impose authorization requirements. This is to ensure that a remote seller can [...]

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